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By incantations a conjurer draws a circle around a person concealing all
within from demons.
Book of Magic
He could not draw a conjurer's circle around the whole matter [by relying
on the privilege] ....
United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259,
266 (1927) (Holmes, J.)
Holmes' dictum did not stand: the privilege against self-incrimination
allows the wholesale concealment of evidence through incantation. Prop-
erly versed in the lore, civil defendants and their employees who intone
the formula at every opportunity can draw a surprisingly wide conjurer's
circle around their conduct, a circle of mystery that works to their advan-
tage. In civil litigation between private parties, current Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence sacrifices the determination of truth, the policies underlying
liberal discovery, and the vindication of public and private rights to an
extent rarely appreciated.
The invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege in a civil case be-
tween private parties calls into play considerations different from those
pertinent in a criminal case.' The difference has been recognized, and the
underlying policies discussed. 2 But no one has systematically explored the
operation of the privilege in the frequently complex procedural battle-
ground of civil litigation.
This Article highlights the marked utility of the privilege to defendants
in civil cases. It demonstrates that private plaintiffs3 will rarely be able to
1. The privilege against self-incrimination has rightly been revered as a shield for defendants in
criminal cases. See, e.g., Griswold, The Fifth Amendment: An Old and Good Friend, 40 A.B.A. J.
502 (1954); McNaughton, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 51 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY,
& POLICE SCL 138 (1960). Nothing here is intended to suggest any need for changing the operation of
the privilege in criminal proceedings.
2. The literature on the use of the Fifth Amendment privilege in civil cases is extensive. See, e.g.,
Kaminsky, Preventing Unfair Use of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Private Civil Litiga-
tion: A Critical Analysis, 39 BROOKLYN L. REV. 121 (1972); Note, Use of the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination in Civil Litigation, 52 VA. L. REV. 322 (1966). Representative commentaries advocate
allowing plaintiffs to maintain actions despite their assertion of the privilege, see Comment, Plaintiff
as Deponent: Invoking the Fifth Amendment, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 158 (1981), and compelling testi-
mony despite the privilege by the granting of protective orders, see Donnici, The Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination in Civil Pre-Tial Discovery: The Use of Protective Orders to Avoid Constitutional
Issues, 3 U.S.F.L. REV. 12 (1968), and immunity, see Note, Constitutional Law: Self-Incrimination
and Court Granted Immunity in Civil Litigation, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 243 (1974).
3. This Article focuses on civil litigation in which the government is not a party. Because the
government may compel responses by giving use immunity, see 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976), the privilege
is a much less potent weapon when the government is the plaintiff or when the government's case is
consolidated for discovery with private cases. See generally infra pp. 1100-02 (arguing that judicial
grants of use immunity are an unsatisfactory solution to privilege problems in civil suits between
private parties).
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pierce the conjurer's circle and compel responses-at least when defense
counsel exploit the privilege's full potential. Yet the policies behind the
privilege do not apply with full force in civil cases and do not preclude
allowing plaintiffs some remedies to reduce the disadvantages they suffer
when the privilege is used against them. The Article evaluates possible
remedies for such plaintiffs and identifies certain remedies that should be
routinely allowed.
I. The Versatility of the Privilege as a Weapon
The privilege provides defense counsel determined to resist discovery
and retard the progress of the civil action with a potent weapon against
private plaintiffs. Its potency derives from the many occasions on which it
may be invoked and from its resistance to attack when invoked.
A. Occasions for Use
The privilege may be used in a great range of civil cases. It may be
used whenever information sufficiently relevant to civil liability to be dis-
coverable provides even a clue that might point a hypothetical government
investigator toward evidence of criminal conduct.4 In a routine divorce
case, for example, a defendant husband may invoke by arguing that his
response to questions about his assets would provide clues suggesting that
the assets had been acquired illegally or had not been fully reported on his
tax returns.' More obviously, the privilege may be used in civil actions
where conduct giving rise to civil liability also constitutes an element of a
crime. Examples include divorce actions involving adultery,6 civil rights
actions involving assaults,7 securities actions involving fraud,' personal in-
jury actions involving criminal negligence," and antitrust actions involving
violations of the Sherman Act.10
4. See infra p. 1072.
5. Cf Depew v. Hanover Ins. Co., 73 F.R.D. 101 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (in civil case between
private parties no adverse inference may be drawn from invoking of privilege by plaintiff in response
to questions about tax returns).
6. See Annest v. Annest, 49 Wash. 2d 62, 298 P.2d 483 (1956).
7. See Coalition of Black Leadership v. Cianci, 480 F. Supp. 1340, 1343-44 (D.R.I. 1979).
8. See In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litig., 347 F. Supp. 1347 (E.D. Pa. 1972); cf Amana Soc'y v.
Selzer, 250 Iowa 380, 94 N.W.2d 337 (1959) (action against fiduciary involving fraud); Ikeda v.
Curtis, 43 Wash. 2d 449, 457-58, 261 P.2d 684, 689-90 (1953) (action, against seller of real estate
and hotel business, involving fraud and prostitution).
9. See Walton v. Robert E. Haas Constr. Corp., 259 So. 2d 731, 733-34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1972) (automobile accident).
10. See In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig. (Appeal of Brown), 609 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1979).
For the use of the privilege in other non-criminal proceedings, see Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S.
308, 316-320 (1976) (prison disciplinary action); Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100, 103-06 (1st
Cir. 1978) (school disciplinary action); Ryan v. Montana, 580 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1978) (probation
revocation action); Arthurs v. Stem, 560 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1977) (physician disciplinary action); In
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The privilege may be used even if the invokers realize, as a practical
matter, that they would not be prosecuted for the conduct they would oth-
erwise be forced to reveal." For instance, the policies of antitrust prosecu-
tors eliminate any likelihood that a corporate executive will be prosecuted
for assisting his company in a joint research project, even if the project
constitutes an antitrust violation when evaluated under the rule of rea-
son.' 2 Yet because any violation of either section of the Sherman Antitrust
Act is technically a crime,'3 the executive will be able to invoke the privi-
lege in response to any inquiries about the project when the company is
sued in a private action. As a result, he may conceal much information
from the private plaintiff, an advantage available, ironically, only because
Congress so opposed antitrust violations that it created criminal as well as
re Meredosia Harbor & Fleeting Serv., 545 F.2d 583, 590-91 (7th Cir. 1976) (bankruptcy); lannelli
v. Long, 487 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1973) (civil tax action); Stillman Pond, Inc. v. Watson, 115 Cal. App.
2d 440, 444, 252 P.2d 717, 718 (1953) (license revocation action against real estate agent).
11. The long-standing American rule is that the privilege may be invoked as long as a mere
"possibility" of prosecution for the crimes suggested by the response exists. See United States v. John-
son, 488 F.2d 1206, 1209 (1st Cir. 1972); United States v. Miranti, 253 F.2d 135, 139 (2d Cir.
1958). This rule differs from the English rule requiring "that the danger [of prosecution] to the
apprehended must be real and appreciable, with reference to the ordinary operation of law in the
ordinary course of things." The Queen v. Boyes, 1 Best & Smith 311, 331, 121 Eng. Rep. 730, 738
(Q.B. 1861). At one time American law appeared to adopt the English view. See Heike v. United
States, 227 U.S. 131 (1913).
In the modern era a lower American court, indignant at the obstructive potential of the privilege in
civil cases, has occasionally adopted the English view, only to be promptly reversed. E.g., In re
Brogna, 589 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1978) (reversing district court order compelling testimony); In re Fold-
ing Carton Antitrust Litig., 465 F. Supp. 618 (N.D. Il. 1979), rev'd, 609 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1979).
Only a statutory grant of use immunity by the prosecution is sufficient to negate the possibility of
future prosecution and, hence, to allow compulsion of testimony. See United States v. D'Apice, 664
F.2d 75, 77-78 (5th Cir. 1981) (federal prosecutor has no authority to confer non-statutory use immu-
nity on witness because immunity would not bind prosecutors in other districts); United States v.
Smith, 436 F.2d 787, 790 (5th Cir.) (court has no authority to guarantee immunity from prosecution
to alibi witnesses or to guarantee that their testimony could not be used against them in later prosecu-
tion), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 976 (1971); Ellis v. United States, 416 F.2d 791, 796 (D.D.C. 1969)
(court has no authority to confer immunity in order to compel witness to testify). But see Little Rock
School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 62, 809, at 78, 722-23 (E.D. Ark. 1979)
(non-statutory guarantee of use immunity by federal prosecutors is constitutionally enforceable "sol-
emn promise" allowing compulsion of testimony).
12. The Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice has long adhered to an
announced policy of criminally prosecuting only those antitrust violations involving price-fixing and
dearly predatory conduct. Speech by Assistant Attorney General Donald I. Baker to the Antitrust
Law Briefing Conference (February 28, 1977) (on file with Yale Law Journal). Consequently, those
who invoke the Fifth Amendment in civil cases because their responses would provide clues or evi-
dence of monopolizing, or participation in tying arrangements, group boycotts, exclusive dealing ar-
rangements, vertical territorial restraints, or any rule of reason violations face no realistic danger of
prosecution at the federal level.
13. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976). The Supreme Court, in United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 438 U.S. 422, 443 (1978), suggested that intent to restrain trade must be proved in any criminal
prosecution under the Sherman Act, even though such proof may not be necessary to establish civil
liability under the Act. This holding suggests that not all civil antitrust violations will necessarily
constitute crimes. Nevertheless, all responses tending to show a rule of reason violation of the Sher-





The prototypical use of the privilege by a civil defendant on the witness
stand represents but one of the many stages in the civil case when the
privilege may be used. When defendants are individuals or sole proprie-
torships," they may also use the privilege to refuse to submit answers to
allegations in the complaint" and to refuse to respond to interrogatories,'6
requests for admissions, 7 and questions at depositions." They may also be
able to use the privilege to resist requests and subpoenas for documents to
the same extent that they could use it to resist government subpoenas for
documents in criminal cases. 9
Because an organizational entity like a corporation or partnership has
no Fifth Amendment privilege,"0 it may not invoke the privilege itself.
Nevertheless, a corporate defendant may use the privilege of its employ-
ees 21 to its advantage in a number of ways. Most importantly, its employ-
ees may invoke the privilege in order to resist any potentially incriminat-
ing questions at deposition or at trial.22 In addition, any attempt by the
14. The privilege applies to the business records as well as to the personal documents of a sole
proprietor. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87-88 (1974) (dictum).
15. See de Antonio v. Solomon, 42 F.R.D. 320, 322 (D. Mass. 1967).
16. See Gordon v. FDIC, 427 F.2d 578, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United States v. Forty-Seven
Bottles, More or Less, of Jenasol, 26 F.R.D. 4 (D.N.J. 1960); Paul Harrigan & Sons, Inc. v. Enter-
prise Animal Oil Co., 14 F.R.D. 333 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
17. In a few instances courts have compelled answers to requests for admissions on the ground
that under FED. R. CIV. P. 36(b) such admissions could not be used as evidence in other cases. E.g.,
Woods v. Robb, 171 F.2d 539 (5th Cir. 1948); United States v. LaFontaine, 12 F.R.D. 518 (D.R.I.
1952). Because that approach overlooks the possibility that the admissions may provide clues that can
be used in future prosecutions, those cases are now regarded as "clearly untenable." Note, The Con-
stitutional Limits of Discovery, 35 IND. L.J. 337, 346 (1960); see 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2018, at 142 (1970).
18. See, e.g., Duffy v. Currier, 291 F. Supp. 810 (D. Minn. 1968); National Discount Corp. v.
Holzbaugh, 13 F.R.D. 236 (E.D. Mich. 1952).
19. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Minnesota State Bar Ass'n v. Divorce Assis-
tance Ass'n, 311 Minn. 276, 248 N.W.2d 733 (1976); Rice v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 208
Okla. 440, 257 P.2d 292 (1953). But see United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845, 852 (5th Cir.
1969).
The protection given documents in civil and criminal cases was restricted in Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391 (1976). Fisher held that the production of an accountant's workpapers could be com-
pelled from the accountant's client, despite their tendency to incriminate the client, because the
workpapers were not of a testimonial character. Id. at 409-14. When the implied admissions from
producing documents incriminate, however, the documents may still be suppressed. Id. at 410-414.
20. All business entities with their own legal identity for Fifth Amendment purposes-and there-
fore unable to invoke the privilege on their own behalf-will be referred to simply as "corporations."
This group includes corporations, see George Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reid, 392 U.S. 286, 288-89
(1968); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 196, 208-10 (1946), partnerships,
see Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974), and unincorporated associations, see Local 57, Int'l
Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Wertz, 326 F.2d 467 (1st Cir. 1964). It does not include sole proprie-
torships. Bellis, 417 U.S. at 88.
21. For the sake of brevity, all officers, employees, and agents of a business entity whose actions
can render the business entity liable will be referred to simply as "employees."
22. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1964); . Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190
(1955) (upholding claim of privilege by member of union in congressional investigation of union).
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plaintiff to depose the corporation itself (under the special rules of discov-
ery created for this purpose)23 may be blocked because the agent the cor-
poration appoints to testify on its behalf may invoke his own privilege
whenever his testimony might incriminate him.
2
Under certain circumstances a corporation may even use the privilege of
its employees to refuse to submit an answer, or to refuse to respond to
interrogatories and requests for admissions. One possible method is to en-
sure that no employee or agent may sign the corporation's response with-
out incriminating himself." Although the corporation must attempt to find
an agent to sign the response who will not invoke the privilege,26 the
plaintiff may have no solution if such an agent cannot be found.27
Even if the plaintiff identifies an agent able to sign without fear of
incrimination, the defendant corporation may raise another claim to resist
these discovery requests. It may argue that the appointed agent is unable
to respond because the employees with the requested information refuse to
reveal the information to the agent on the ground that it would tend to
incriminate them. If sustained, this "impossibility" claim would open a
23. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6), 31(a), 32(a)(2). Under these rules, the plaintiff may depose an
agent of the defendant corporation who will testify on the corporation's behalf at the deposition. The
deposition of the agent may be used against the defendant corporation for any purpose. FED. R. Civ.
P. 32(a)(2).
24. Cf Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957) (custodian of union records could invoke
privilege in response to questions of grand jury investigating union when answers would incriminate
him).
25. See In re Siegel Trading Co. [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1
20,637, at 22,600-01 (1978) (declining to penalize corporate defendant for failure to respond to re-
quests for admission because no agent could be found who could respond on behalf of defendant
without incriminating himself); Priebe v. World Ventures, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 1244, 1246 (C.D. Cal.
1976) (ordering corporation to answer interrogatories but noting that a "reformulation" of the order
might be necessary if corporation was unable to appoint anyone to answer who would not thereby
incriminate himself); see also United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 9 (1970) (declining to decide the
"troublesome question" arising where no one could answer interrogatories addressed to a corporation
without subjecting himself to danger of prosecution).
26. See United States v. 3963 Bottles, More or Less, of Enerjol Double Strength, 265 F.2d 332,
336 (7th Cir. 1959). The Federal Rules envision that the agent is to interrogate corporate employees
so thoroughly that he will know all the information they possess that is pertinent to the interrogato
ries. See General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1210 (8th Cir. 1973). Exper-
ienced litigators may feel, however, that this duty is honored more in the breach. Often the agent
starts out uninformed about corporate matters and seems less than eager to undertake an extensive
investigation.
27. How often such a case arises is unclear. In light of the great range of information that may
"tend to incriminate," the corporation's response may indeed tend to incriminate all of its employees
when the corporation is small. To be sure, corporate counsel may be able to respond to these discovery
requests on behalf of the corporation and may be unwilling or unable to invoke the privilege. But
corporate counsel may take the position that information in his possession is protected by the work-
product or attorney-client privileges. See Weissenberger, Toward Precision in the Application of the
Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporations, 65 IOWA L. REV. 899, 903-04 n.26 (1980) (discussing
suppression of corporate information through use of corporate attorney's privilege); Note, Privileged
Communications-Inroads on the "Control Group" Test in the Corporate Area, 22 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 759, 766 (1971) (same).
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major loophole for corporations seeking to resist discovery."' Yet the cor-
poration's argument-that the employees' refusal to cooperate with the
agent puts his information beyond its reach and prevents it from reply-
ing-contains some surface appeal.2" The ingenuous rejoinder merely re-
lies on the tautology that the employee's information is the corporation's
information; when the corporation does not respond to the interrogatories
with all its information, it violates the discovery rules regardless of the
agent's good-faith efforts to comply."
A cognate issue arises from the employees' claim that incriminating
themselves to the corporate agent creates the same dangers as incriminat-
ing themselves to the plaintiff, and hence should not be compelled.' But
again, the tautology goes, when the employees are asked to assist the
agent, they are being asked to act in a representative capacity-as corpo-
ration employees. Because they are assisting the agent in their capacity as
representatives of a corporation that has no privilege, they have no privi-
28. This impossibility claim appears to be asserted most frequently in private antitrust cases. See
Cooper, Fifth Amendment Rights in Private Treble Damage Litigation, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 1381,
1392-95 (1979).
29. The language of some cases suggests without elaboration that a corporation need reply only
with the information available from sources under its control. E.g., Holt v. Southern Ry. Co., 51
F.R.D. 296, 299 (E.D. Tenn. 1969). Arguably this would not include information suppressed from its
agent by a personal privilege of its employees.
30. E.g., In re Anthracite Coal Antitrust Litig., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,511 (M.D. Pa.
1979) (defendant corporation violates discovery rules and subjects itself to Rule 37 sanctions even
when compliance is prevented by employees' assertions of privilege); In re Folding Carton Antitrust
Litig., 76 F.R.D. 417 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (same); see also George Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reid, 392
U.S. 286 (1968) (penalizing corporation for its officer's refusal to waive privilege).
Even though the defendant corporation that raised the "impossibility" claim may therefore be re-
quired to submit a different response to plaintiff's complaint, interrogatories, and requests for admis-
sions, its initial response may have achieved the purpose of delaying plaintiff's discovery. Because the
corporation can muster some colorable arguments for its "impossibility" claim, Rule 37 sanctions
against it are unlikely.
31. The employee is plainly forced to put himself in danger of prosecution when he is forced to
tell all to the agent, for the agent may reveal his statements in the corporation's response. The agent
may even be required to indicate that the source for the information in the response was the employee.
B&S Drilling Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 24 F.R.D. 1, 14 (S.D. Tex. 1959). Conse-
quently, being compelled to talk to the agent may be as likely to lead to criminal prosecution as being
compelled to talk to the opposing party directly. The employee is then as much the instrument of his
own undoing, and faces as cruel a choice between incrimination, perjury, and contempt, in the one
case as in the other. Cf 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2259b, at 359 (j. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)
(corporate custodian's unsuccessful arguments against being forced to produce incriminating corporate
documents echo successful arguments of individuals asked to produce their incriminating documents).
Nevertheless, Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911), would seem to foreclose the claim that
employees are entitled to invoke the Fifth Amendment rather than assist the corporate agent:
A command to the corporation is in effect a command to those who are officially responsible
for the conduct of its affairs. If they, apprised of the writ directed to the corporation, prevent
compliance or fail to take appropriate action within their power for the performance of the
corporate duty, they, no less than the corporation itself, are guilty of disobedience and may be
punished for contempt.
Id. at 376. But see Paul Harrigan & Sons, Inc. v. Enterprise Animal Oil Co., 14 F.R.D. 333 (E.D.
Pa. 1953) (suggesting that privilege protects individual employees from being forced to disclose in-
criminatory information to designated corporate agent).
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lege. This tautology, however, conflicts with the rule that an employee
may invoke the privilege rather than sign the corporation's response to
interrogatories,32 an act also performed in a representative capacity.
Whatever the final decision on such defense claims, their mere assertion
ought to suggest that the value of the privilege in retarding the plaintiff's
discovery and increasing his expenses may only be limited by the clever-
ness of the defendants' attorneys.
By invoking the privilege at every opportunity, defendants and their
employees may conceivably deflect all discovery requests except for docu-
ment requests aimed at defendant corporations. Even if future cases re-
duce a corporation's ability to use the privilege of its employees to resist
discovery requests directed to it, the employees will surely still be able to
invoke the privilege at depositions. Yet assertions of privilege that nullify
the value of depositions (the most fruitful discovery vehicle) most threaten
the policies underlying liberal discovery. 3
Because the discovery rules provide that privileged information is not
discoverable," none of the usual sanctions for failure to grant discovery"
may be imposed when discovery is resisted by claiming the privilege. Even
the discovery rules that seek to narrow the issues by requiring a defendant
either to admit or to deny specific allegations-such as the rules governing
answers and requests for admissions-may be frustrated by invoking the
privilege. According to the weight of authority, invoking the privilege on
the answer36 or in response to requests for admissions37 gives the defen-
32. See United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7 (1970). When the Court embraced this rule in
Kordel, it seemed to be under the misconception that the privilege would no longer be available once
the prosecution of the employee was completed. Id. at 9. In fact, however, the privilege remains
available as long as the response may be used against the invoker in any possible future prosecution.
See, e.g., In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig. (appeal of Brown), 609 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1979).
33. The literature explaining the reasons supporting liberal discovery is extensive. E.g., Frost,
The Ascertainment of Truth by Discovery, 28 F.R.D. 89 (1960); Holtzoff, The Elimination of Sur-
prise in Federal Practice, 7 VAND. L. REV. 576 (1954).
34. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a) (providing for "objection" to requests
for admission); 4A J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & D. EPSTEIN, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 36.04[3] (2d
ed. 1982) (discussing claim of privilege against self-incrimination in response to request for admis-
sion). FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c) provides that at depositions, evidence objected to shall be taken subject to
the objections. The courts, however, have held that this provision does not require a response where
the objection rests on the privilege against self-incrimination. E.g., Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig
Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 460-61 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Preyer v. United States Lines, Inc., 64 F.R.D.
430 (E.D. Pa. 1973), alf'd, 546 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1976).
35. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (authorizing sanctions, including contempt and dismissal, for failure to
comply with discovery orders).
36. See de Antonio v. Solomon, 42 F.R.D. 320, 322 (D. Mass. 1967); 5 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1280, at 360-61 (1969). But see In re Sterling Har-
ris Ford, Inc., 315 F.2d 277 (7th Cir.) (respondents to a turnover petition are not entitled to use
privilege "as a sword permitting them to circumvent Rule 8(d) F.R. Civ. P . ), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 814 (1963).
37. See 4A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, supra note 34, 1 36.04[3]; 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra
note 17, § 2018, at 145-48.
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dant the benefits of a verified good faith denial, in that the plaintiff is put
to his proof. To take the allegations as admitted, according to one court,
would impose an impermissible cost on invoking the privilege. 8
B. Resistance to Attack
Part of the strength of the privilege as a weapon lies in the difficulty of
successfully challenging its assertion. An assertion of privilege may be at-
tacked and a response compelled when the response would not incrimi-
nate, or when prosecution of the invoker for the crimes for which his
response incriminates him is barred by the attachment of jeopardy, the
running of the statute of limitations, or past grants of immunity. As we
shall see, however, most assertions of privilege prove highly resistant to
attack.
1. Attacking on the Ground that the Response Will not Incriminate
The plaintiff may attack a claim of privilege by defendants or their
employees on the ground that the invoker's response would not in fact
tend to incriminate. But a combination of principles from past cases"' all
but ensure that the court will not be able to overrule the claim on this
ground. Of course, the invoker's claim that his response may tend to in-
criminate is not enough; the court must decide that the response may in-
criminate. 0 But this principle has lost any practical significance in light of
the standards the court must apply.
The first standard operating in favor of the invoker is a broadly inclu-
sive notion of incriminating responses. Currently, a response "tends to in-
criminate" as long as it might provide a clue leading investigators to dis-
cover facts that could constitute links in a chain of circumstantial evidence
38. See de Antonio v. Solomon, 42 F.R.D. 320, 322 (D. Mass. 1967) ("Such a sanction would
make the assertion of that privilege indeed 'costly,' and would be the kind of watering down of the
privilege which the Supreme Court has clearly proscribed.") The court in de Antonio borrowed indi-
rectly from Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, there
pointed out that allowing the prosecutor to comment on the defendant's refusal to testify under the
privilege against self-incrimination violated that privilege since such comment "cuts down on the priv-
ilege by making its assertion costly." Id. at 614.
39. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951), and United States v. Coffey, 198 F.2d 438
(3d Cir. 1952), are the most notable cases establishing the standards that govern when Fifth Amend-
ment claims are challenged. See also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1964) (reaffirming Hoff-
man); Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 198 n.18 (1955) (approving Coffey).
40. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); Malloy v. Hogan, 150 Conn. 220,
224-25, 187 A.2d 744, 747 (1963), rev'd on other grounds, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); In re Petty, 18 Utah
2d 320, 324, 422 P.2d 659, 661-62 (1967). But see David Webb, Inc. v. Rosenstiel, 66 Misc. 2d 29,
33, 319 N.Y.S.2d 877, 881 (Sup. Ct. Special Term 1970) ("[Tjhe witness is the best judge of whether
an answer will tend to incriminate him, since he is obviously in possession of more facts than are
known to the court or other parties . . .")
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proving the invoker's criminal conduct.41 Finding any responses to be
wholly free of an incriminating potential under this standard is difficult.' 2
For instance, a response that denies wrongdoing and provides exculpatory
information may tend to incriminate by helping the government pinpoint
more fruitful areas of inquiry. 3 Determining whether responses will tend
to incriminate, therefore, requires predictions not only about possible in-
ferences from circumstantial evidence but also about possible investigatory
paths. Yet at the time the court must decide the plaintiff's challenge,
which may be early in the case, the information needed for these predic-
tions is not likely to be available.
The second principle undermining the court's ability to overrule an as-
sertion of the privilege forbids the court from requiring the invoker to tell
the court what his response would be. Revealing his response-even in an
in camera hearing-would, the courts say, "surrender the very protection
which the privilege is designed to guarantee." 4" Thus, courts must in ef-
41. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); Coffey v. United States, 198 F.2d 438,
440 (3d Cir. 1952); Allen v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 520, 524, 557 P.2d 65, 66, 134 Cal. Rptr.
774, 775 (1976).
The breadth of this standard becomes apparent when compared with the less inclusive standards
rejected. For instance, one might consider incriminating only responses that amount to confessions, in
that they admit all elements of a crime. Or one might narrow the standard even further by including
only responses that provide information likely to be helpful to the government. Under this narrow
approach, responses that admit complete crimes but that are likely only to provide cumulative evi-
dence, for example, would not be considered incriminatory. On occasion the Supreme Court has sug-
gested that it may move toward such a standard. In Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), for
example, the taxpayer sought to avoid compliance with a subpoena for certain documents in his pos-
session. In requiring compliance, the Court stated: "The existence and location of the papers are a
foregone conclusion and the taxpayer adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Government's
information by conceding that he in fact has the papers." Id. at 411.
Another approach might consider incriminating responses admitting some but not all elements of a
crime. A still more inclusive approach might encompass responses that provide only "a link in a chain
of evidence" showing criminal conduct. See Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 461 (1975); Blau v.
United States, 340 U.S. 159, 161 (1950).
42. Because responses providing only a link in the chain may be innocuous on their face, analysis
of the incriminatory character of the response requires a good deal of information about the back-
ground of the crime and the other circumstantial evidence by which the crime might be shown. E.g.,
In re Atterbury, 316 F.2d 106, 109-110 (6th Cir. 1963) (trial court erred in refusing to allow wit-
nesses to show circumstances that made testimony demanded of him self-incriminatory); In re Portell,
245 F.2d 183, 185 (7th Cir. 1957) (trial court erred in excluding from evidence newspaper clippings
showing how witness's testimony would be self-incriminating); Ballantyne v. United States, 237 F.2d
657, 664-65 (5th Cir. 1956) (reviewing prior statements of witness to IRS agents and grand jury to
conclude that answering grand jury questions would incriminate witness).
43. See Noonan, Inferences from the Invocation of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 41
VA. L. REV. 311, 328-31 (1955); Ratner, Consequences of Exercising the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 472, 489-93 (1957). Cf Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477
(1966) ("[N]o distinction may be drawn between inculpatory statements and statements alleged to be
merely 'exculpatory.' . . . In fact, statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are
often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths in the statement given under
interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implication.")
44. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). As Judge Learned Hand observed:
Obviously a witness may not be compelled to do more than show that the answer is likely to be
dangerous to him, else he will be forced to disclose those very facts which the privilege protects.
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fect apply the highly inclusive standard for an incriminating response to
an unknown response.
To be sure, courts require the invoker to show the incriminating poten-
tial of his response.4" But another principle comes to the invoker's aid and
all but guarantees that the requirement will be met: the incriminatory
potential of the response may be shown merely by argument, and without
evidence." In practice, the invoker's attorney need only sketch a scenario
of how a possible but still unknown response might provide direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence of criminal conduct or clues leading to evidence of
criminal conduct.
The ease of showing the incriminatory potential of a possible response
is best appreciated if a fourth principle is kept in mind: a person need not
believe himself guilty of criminal conduct to invoke. Because the privilege
extends to any incriminating "evidence," the invoker may claim its protec-
tion as long as he believes his response may help a prosecutor mount a
case, however misguided, against him. A court therefore may be required
to uphold an invocation of privilege even when the invoker insists he has
never committed a crime. 47 Logically-although no opinions have reached
this issue-the invoker's attorney should prevail as long as he can fit a
possible response into a plausible, though mistaken, chain of evidence that
a future prosecutor might devise.
Another principle operating to ensure success for the claim that the re-
sponse might incriminate gives the benefit of any doubt to the invoker. In
the Supreme Court's words, a response may not be compelled unless it is
"'perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in
the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possi-
bly have such tendency' to incriminate."48 Considering the maze of predic-
Logically, indeed, he is boxed in a paradox, for he must prove the criminatory character of
what it is his privilege to suppress just because it is criminatory.
United States v. Weisman, 111 F.2d 260, 262 (2d Cir. 1940). Of course, the judge and the party
seeking to show that the response would not incriminate are also boxed into this paradox.
Professor Westen has pointed out that with all other privileges the court can compel the witness to
disclose his response in camera. Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of
Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REV. 567, 581 n.38 (1978). An in camera proceeding for
assessing Fifth Amendment privilege claims, however, is "less feasible." Id. But see United States v.
Melchor Moreno, 536 F.2d 1042, 1047 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1976) (dictum) (in camera hearing may
afford witness protection equivalent to statutory immunity, although issue is a "difficult one").
45. See supra p. 1071.
46. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1958); Capitol Prods. Corp. v. Hernon,
457 F.2d 541, 544 (8th Cir. 1972); Isaacs v. United States, 256 F.2d 654, 658-60 (8th Cir. 1958);
United States v. Coffey, 198 F.2d 438, 440 (3d Cir. 1952). Even an explanation of how the response
could be incriminatory may not be required if such an explanation would result in incriminatory
disclosure. See In re Ippolito, 75 N.J. 435, 441, 383 A.2d 117, 120 (1978).
47. See Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 421 (1957); Ullman v. United States, 350
U.S. 422, 426-28 (1956).
48. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 488 (1951) (quoting Temple v. Commonwealth, 75
Va. 892, 898 (1881)) (emphasis deleted); see In re Atterbury, 316 F.2d 106, 110 (6th Cir. 1963);
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tive judgments involved in deciding whether even a known response will
"tend to incriminate" under one or another of the available grounds,
doubt is one thing the Court should expect. The sources of doubt abound;
there is doubt about the possible responses, the possible crimes, the possi-
ble evidentiary chains, and the possible investigatory paths. There may
also be doubt about the application of the law to known conduct. In anti-
trust cases, for example, witnesses may claim that although they always
believed their conduct to be innocent, the uncertain reach of the antitrust
laws leads them to invoke the privilege as a safety measure. 49
This combination of principles, at least in cases where civil liability
springs from criminal conduct, gives defendants and their employees faced
with requests for information a virtual option to invoke."0 Since these
principles were embraced, reported decisions finding that the invoker's re-
sponse would not tend to incriminate have been rare indeed.'
Even if the plaintiff occasionally satisfies the court that the invoker's
response could not possibly incriminate him, the victory may be pyrrhic.
For the privilege could be invoked again in response to each separate
question or request for information." The expense of challenging each
claim will often exceed the benefit the plaintiff derives from the response
on that rare occasion when his challenge is successful.
Nothing said here, it should be emphasized, is meant to criticize the
legal standards now applied when invokings are challenged. Responses
providing clues need to be protected to keep the privilege meaningful. Put-
ting greater burdens on the invoker may undermine the purpose of the
United States v. Miranti, 253 F.2d 135, 139 (2d Cir. 1958); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 139, at
295 (2d ed. 1972).
49. This claim is most plausible in rule of reason antitrust cases. In these cases, ironically, the
policies of enforcement officials remove any practical danger of prosecution. See supra note 12. Even
in civil price-fixing cases, however, the invoker who claims to be innocent can assert that the uncertain
legality of exchanges of price information, for example, requires him to invoke. The uncertain legality
of exchanges of price information can be seen by comparing United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978), with United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
50. In fact, a stringent waiver rule holding that one who provides facts waives the privilege as to
details encourages invoking at the earliest opportunity. See Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148
(1958); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
51. At the Supreme Court level, Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), and Zicarelli v.
New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972), are two such cases. In contrast,
numerous circuit court opinions that overruled claims of privilege have been reversed per curiam. E.g.,
Simpson v. United States, 241 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1957), rev'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 976 (1959);
United States v. Trock, 232 F.2d 839 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd per curiam, 351 U.S. 976 (1956); United
States v. Singleton, 193 F.2d 464 (3d Cir.), rev'd per curiam, 343 U.S. 944 (1952); United States v.
Greenberg, 192 F.2d 201 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd per curiam, 343 U.S. 918 (1952).
52. In civil cases one must ordinarily invoke the privilege question by question. See Hudson Tire
Mart v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 518 F.2d 671, 674 (2d Cir. 1975); In re Penn Cent. Sec.
Litig., 347 F. Supp. 1347, 1348 (E.D. Pa. 1972). Only in rare instances will a blanket refusal to
testify be upheld. See, e.g., Priebe v. World Ventures, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 1244, 1246 (C.D. Cal. 1976)
("Here . . . any proper question in the civil context inherently gives rise to self-incrimination
hazards.")
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privilege. But the likelihood that current standards will persist for lack of
better ones only underscores the need to appreciate the obstructive poten-
tial of the privilege.
2. Attacking on the Ground that Prosecution is Barred by Double
Jeopardy
The plaintiff may claim that the privilege cannot be invoked because
prosecution of the invoker for crimes revealed by his response is barred by
the prohibition on double jeopardy. In practice, however, the double jeop-
ardy rule offers the plaintiff no help. Even if the invoker has already been
prosecuted, he will almost always be able to point to some crime for which
his response may tend to incriminate him and to which jeopardy has not
attached.
The threat of prosecution may exist despite previous prosecution if the
conduct at issue is subject to the criminal sanctions of more than one juris-
diction. Securities fraud, for example, is often a state as well as a federal
offense." In fact, the potential for geographically widespread effects will
often render an instance of fraud subject to the jurisdiction of several
states. 4 Under double jeopardy standards, prosecution by one jurisdiction
does not bar prosecution by any other.5 Hence one previously convicted of
securities fraud will be able to invoke the privilege in a private civil action
53. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976) and S.E.C. Rule 1Ob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240, 10b-5 (1981) with
COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-124 (Supp. 1981) and UNIF. SECURITIES ACT §§ 101, 409, 7 U.L.A. 568,
665 (1958).
Antitrust is another area of overlapping state and federal criminal law. Compare 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2
(1976) with CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16,700-16,758 (West 1981 & Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, 60 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); and COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-4-101 to -109 (1973 & Supp.
1981). All states but Connecticut impose some criminal sanction for antitrust violations.
54. Section 414 of the Uniform Securities Act, which has been substantially adopted in approxi-
mately 35 states, makes clear that the criminal provisions of a state's Blue Sky Law may apply to a
seller of securities who has not performed within the state every act necessary to complete the offense,
and even to a person who has never been in the state. Of course, the seller's conduct may also subject
him to criminal liability in the state where he resided and in which the acts occurred. Thus a seller
residing in one state who is guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation in a sale to a buyer residing in a
second state is subject to separate prosecutions under the Blue Sky Laws of both states. UNIF. SECURI-
TIES ACT § 414(a)-(f) Commissioners' Note, 7 U.L.A. 692-93 (1958).
A state will obtain jurisdiction rather easily even when much of the conduct at issue occurred
elsewhere. E.g., Frasher v. State, 8 Md. App. 439, 260 A.2d 656 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970) (defen-
dant possessing narcotics who was forcibly brought into Maryland could then be prosecuted for pos-
session of contraband even if another jurisdiction had already prosecuted for same crime). A single
price-fixing conspiracy could also subject the conspirators to prosecution by many states as well as by
the federal government. See Sims, Two Bites At the Apple?-Double Jeopardy and the Antitrust
Laws, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 1401, 1412 (1979).
55. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (indictment and guilty plea under state
statute outlawing destruction of property of another does not preclude prosecution based on same
conspiracy under federal statute outlawing destruction of federal communications facilities); Bartkus v.
Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 127-39 (1959) (trial and acquittal under federal bank robbery statute did not
preclude prosecution on substantially the same evidence under state robbery statute). See also United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (prosecution by Indian tribe does not bar federal prosecution).
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based on the same conduct, such as a stockholders' derivative suit, as long
as one jurisdiction that is able to prosecute has not done so.16 That further
prosecution is unlikely because prosecutors have adopted policies against
duplicating prosecutions by other jurisdictions is, as we have seen,
immaterial."
The double jeopardy challenge to an invocation of privilege will also be
foreclosed whenever the invoker's response would tend to incriminate him
for a crime other than the one for which he was prosecuted. For instance,
an invoker who claims his response would incriminate him of conspiring
to fix the prices of one product may always claim, once he has been prose-
cuted for that conspiracy, that his response would also incriminate him of
closely related price-fixing conspiracies involving slightly different prod-
ucts,. customers, regions of the country, co-conspirators, or time periods.
Such differences may render the conspiracies separate crimes. Because
determining whether the conspiracies are separate crimes may require a
full presentation of the facts, the court will often be in no position to
evaluate the invoker's claim when it arises early in the civil case. 9
An invoker previously prosecuted for price-fixing may claim that his
response might also provide evidence of crimes that consist in part of
price-fixing but that require additional elements.' At the federal level,
56. Assertions of privilege have been upheld on numerous occasions despite conviction on federal
criminal charges because the possibility of prosecution by other jurisdictions remained open. E.g.,
United States v. Stephens, 492 F.2d 1367, 1374 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Seavers, 472 F.2d
607 (6th Cir. 1973). A limited exception is that the possibility of prosecution by a foreign government
under its laws will not necessarily sustain a privilege claim. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 532
F.2d 404, 407 (5th Cir. 1976); In re Parker, 411 F.2d 1067 (10th Cir. 1969). But see In re Cardassi,
351 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Conn. 1972) (refusing to compel witness who had received use immunity to
answer grand jury questions because of likelihood of prosecution by Mexico).
57. See supra p. 1066 (privilege still available despite policy of prosecutors against prosecuting
crime that response would tend to reveal). The United States Department of Justice, for example, has
a longstanding policy against duplicating state prosecutions. See Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529,
531 (1960) (per curiam); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL §§ 9-2.142
to .143 (Jan. 3, 1980). The so-called "Petite policy" opposes federal prosecution, after a state prosecu-
tion based on the same act, in the absence of a compelling federal interest. See generally Note, The
Petite Policy: An Example of Enlightened Prosecutorial Discretion, 66 GEO. L.J. 1137 (1978) (dis-
cussing policy). But despite the Petite Policy, conviction at the state level does not bar assertion of the
privilege, since the possibility of federal prosecution remains.
58. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 755 (1946), provides some guidance for determining
whether conspiracies are separate crimes. Quoting with approval from the Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court drew an apt analogy: "Thieves who dispose of their loot to a single receiver-a single
'fence'-do not by that fact alone become confederates: they may but it takes more than knowledge
that he is a fence to make them such." Id. at 755. See also United States v. Sarullo, 510 F.2d 1174,
1178 (6th Cir. 1975) (that victims differ tends to show separate conspiracies); United States v. Arnold,
336 F.2d 347, 351 (9th Cir. 1964) (whether conspiracies to import narcotics are separate is jury
question); United States v. American Honda Motor Co., 273 F. Supp. 810, 816 (N.D. 11. 1967) (that
defendants' conduct contributes to single goal tends to show single conspiracy).
59. Many courts have found they can only decide whether conspiracies are separate after the trial.
E.g., United States v. Young, 503 F.2d 1072, 1077 n.17 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Wilshire Oil
Co., 427 F.2d 969, 975-77 (10th Cir. 1970).
60. Cf. Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 389-90 (1958) (single narcotics sale could subject
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such crimes include mail fraud, racketeering, felony conspiracy, and wire
fraud.6 1 Often the invoker will also be able to point to state crimes that
consist in part of price-fixing. With each of these offenses, the invoker
may be prosecuted for the substantive offense itself and thereafter prose-
cuted for conspiracy to commit that offense, since jeopardy would not at-
tach initially to the conspiracy charge.62 Furthermore, if the invoker has
testified in an earlier proceeding, he may claim his response would pro-
vide evidence that he committed perjury during that previous testimony.
The previously convicted invoker may also point to the possibility that
his response will be admitted as "other crimes" evidence in future prose-
cutions against him for a wide range of crimes. Evidence of his past price-
fixing may be admissible in a prosecution for other crimes under many
different theories. 3 If, for example, the invoker's response would indicate
he always demanded that price-fixing conspiracy meetings be held at 8:00
A.M. in the Executive Room at the Hilton Hotel, the response, by show-
ing his particular modus operandi, might be used to identify him as the
person making a similar demand in a bribery conspiracy." As long as
prosecution for the bribery conspiracy is not barred by double jeopardy,
the privilege may be invoked in the civil price-fixing suit, even though the
invoker has already been prosecuted for his price-fixing conduct.
The invoker may further claim that his response, by providing evidence
of past price-fixing,6s will provide clues that may lead to evidence of other
crimes. In the example above, for instance, the invoker can claim that his
defendant to consecutive punishment under three different federal laws since Congress intended these
laws to punish distinct offenses); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 787-89
(1946) (same conduct in restraint of trade may satisfy some elements of violation of §§ 1 and 2 of
Sherman Act); United States v. Marotta, 518 F.2d 681, 684-85 (9th Cir. 1975) (single chain of events
resulted in prosecution of defendant for conspiracy to import and conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute narcotics). See generally Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (offenses
differ for purposes of double jeopardy if each requires proof of fact not required by the other).
61. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) (felony conspiracy); id. § 1341 (mail fraud); id. § 1343 (wire
fraud); id. § 1962 (racketeering).
62. See United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1209 (1st Cir. 1973); United States v. Chase,
281 F.2d 225, 229 (7th Cir. 1960); United States v. Ward, 314 F. Supp. 261 (E.D. La. 1970); cf
United States v. Maranti, 253 F.2d 135, 138-39 (2d Cir. 1958) (jeopardy on conspiracy count does
not bar prosecution for substantive offense).
63. FED. R. EVID. 404(b), for example, provides that evidence of other crimes may be admissible
to show motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
64. Cf United States v. Serlin, 538 F.2d 737, 747 (7th Cir. 1976) (prior similar acts admitted to
show intent); United States v. Jones, 438 F.2d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 1971) (prior acts showed that
earlier schemes "bore a singular strong resemblance to the pattern of the offense charged").
65. This discussion has assumed that the invoker indicates his response would tend to show price-
fixing conduct for which he has been prosecuted. But some courts do not require the invoker even to
identify the crimes for which his response will tend to incriminate him. E.g., Triangle Publications v.
Ferrare, 4 A.D.2d 591, 168 N.Y.S.2d 128 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961) (privilege claim upheld without
indication of crimes for which response would incriminate). This uncertainty compounds the difficul-
ties facing a plaintiff who must show that the provision against double jeopardy bars use of the
response in any future prosecution.
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response will provide a clue leading a future detective to investigate the
other meetings the invoker attended in that hotel room. Such investiga-
tions, the invoker can claim, will lead to evidence of other crimes. Thus,
the range of crimes for which a response might provide a clue is broad
indeed. Jeopardy will hardly have attached to them all.
3. Attacking on the Ground that Prosecution is Barred by the Statute of
Limitations
Assuming the court is able to identify the crimes for which the invoker's
response may tend to incriminate him, his invoking should be overruled if
the statutes of limitations for prosecuting those crimes have run. Of
course, if the response would tend to incriminate the invoker in several
jurisdictions, the statutes of limitations must have run in all of those
jurisdictions.
A threshold problem is that the court may not know enough about the
supposed criminal conduct-which the invoker may claim did not actually
occur-to ascertain which states might have jurisdiction to prosecute or
when that conduct took place. Because the plaintiff carries the burden of
proving that the limitations period has run, any doubts will be resolved in
the invoker's favor."
Even when the dates of the possible crimes and the jurisdictions able to
prosecute are clear, other problems may arise. Consider again a suit for
damages arising from the defendants' price-fixing. The federal statute of
limitations for price-fixing is five years. 7 The state statutes of limitations
vary; some allow prosecution indefinitely."' But the statutorily imposed
limitations period matters little in price-fixing conspiracies. At least under
federal law, such conspiracies are presumed to continue, and the statute of
limitations does not begin to run in favor of any conspirators until they
"disavow or defeat the purpose" of the conspiracy.69 This may be accom-
plished by alerting law enforcement officials to the conspiracy or by an-
nouncing one's withdrawal from the conspiracy to the co-conspirators. 0
66. See United States v. Goodman, 289 F.2d 256, 262-63 (4th Cir. 1961).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1976).
68. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1331.12 (Page 1979); see also Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Kloster-
man French Baking Co., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 161,361, at 71,273 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (upholding
constitutionality of Ohio's indefinite limitations period).
69. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369 (1912); see United States v. Pearson, 508 F.2d 595,
597 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Nowak, 448 F.2d 134, 139 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1039 (1972); United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 905 (9th Cir. 1970).
70. See Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369-70 (1912) (alerting law enforcement officials);
United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 389 (2d Cir. 1964) (announcing withdrawal to co-conspira-
tors), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 960 (1965). See generally United States v. Colasurdo, 453 F.2d 585, 597
(2d Cir. 1971) (invocation of Fifth Amendment privilege by defendant did not constitute affirmative
action required to withdraw from conspiracy).
1078
Vol. 91: 1062, 1982
Fifth Amendment
An unrepentant conspirator may in theory be prosecuted even when his
price-fixing conduct occurred much more than five years in the past.
Hence the court in the private civil case would need to know a great deal
about the invoker's price-fixing conduct in order to decide if and when the
various statutes of limitations had even begun to run in his favor. Yet the
court may lack any feasible way to acquire this information at the time an
assertion of privilege is challenged. In fact, some courts in conspiracy cases
conclude that the jury must ultimately determine statute of limitations
claims.71
Other arguments for the invoker virtually eliminate any chance that his
privilege claim will be overruled on the ground that all statutes of limita-
tions have run. Even if the invoker cannot be prosecuted for the criminal
conduct his response would admit because all statutes of limitations con-
cerning that conduct have run, he may claim that his conduct might con-
stitute evidence against him in a prosecution for more recent criminal con-
duct. For instance, price-fixing conduct occurring outside the limitations
period can be admitted in evidence for various purposes in timely prosecu-
tions for later price-fixing. "' Similarly, such earlier conduct may provide
evidence in prosecutions for later mall fraud, racketeering, or other crimes
that consist in part of price-fixing. It may also provide "other crimes"
evidence admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence to show a broad
range of later crimes." Furthermore, the invoker's response may provide
evidence that he perjured himself within the limitations period. If all else
fails, the invoker may claim that his response would at least provide a clue
that would lead investigators to find evidence of other crimes for which
the limitations period has not- run.
In order to overrule a privilege claim because the statute of limitations
has run, the court must be able to dismiss with confidence all of these
theories under which the invoker's response may tend to incriminate him.
Once again, however, the information needed for this confidence is not
likely to be available at the time the invocation is challenged; if it is avail-
able, it is likely to be hotly disputed. Moreover, the difficult-if not im-
possible-task of evaluating a challenge based on the running of the stat-
ute of limitations may need to be repeated for each question in response to
71. E.g., United States v. Heckman, 479 F.2d 726, 729 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Borelli,
336 F.2d 376, 389 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 960 (1965).
72. E.g., In re United Shoe Mach. Corp., 7 F.R.D. 756, 757 (D. Mass. 1947); cf. United States
v. Brandom, 479 F.2d 830, 831 n.1 (8th Cir. 1973) (acts occurring outside limitations period admissi-
ble in mail fraud prosecution). The earlier conduct may be admissible to show, for example, the
conspiracy's origin, see Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 145 (1913); Continental Baking Co. v.
United States, 281 F.2d 137, 154 (6th Cir. 1960), or its purpose, see United States v. Ashdown, 509
F.2d 793, 798 (5th Cir. 1975).
73. See supra note 63.
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which the privilege is invoked. 74
4. Attacking on the Ground that Prosecution is Barred by Past Grants
of Use Immunity
Sometimes the invoker in the civil case has previously received use im-
munity for his testimony in an earlier prosecution or civil proceeding in-
volving the government. Such immunity may have been conferred in order
to compel responses to inquiries similar to those put by plaintiffs in civil
cases. If the plaintiff can establish that any future prosecutorial use of the
invoker's possible responses has been foreclosed by this immunity, the
privilege claim could be overruled and a response compelled.
But this form of attack on the privilege should also fail. Since the re-
placement of transactional immunity with use immunity, 5 future prosecu-
tion of the invoker is always a theoretical possibility provided the govern-
ment makes no use, directly or indirectly, of the responses it compelled
with its immunity order. 6 Because the immunity order does not apply to
the invoker's responses in the private civil suit, those incriminatory re-
sponses could always in theory be used to prosecute him.
Recently some courts have struggled to find that grants of use immunity
in previous actions or proceedings necessarily foreclose prosecutorial use
of whatever testimony the invoker may give in the private civil case.77
Such findings would allow the invoker's testimony to be compelled with-
out any involvement by the government. This "prospective taint" ap-
proach is a tribute to the ingenuity of judges who realize the obstructive
potential of the privilege and the lack of any realistic danger to the in-
voker who has been given use immunity in an earlier proceeding. Because
the approach represents a remedial response to the problems created by
the full exploitation of the privilege under conventional notions of use im-
munity, it is evaluated together with other remedies in Part III below.
74. In that rare instance when the court can overrule the privilege claim because the statute of
limitations prevents use of the response in any criminal case against the invoker, the response com-
pelled is likely to be too dated to be of use in the plaintiff's civil action. A private action under the
Sherman Act, for example, is subject to a four year limitations period, see 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1976),
although the Hyde principle, see supra p. 1078, and the possibility that the government action will
toll the statute may extend the limitations period significantly.
75. See United States v. Kuehn, 562 F.2d 427, 430-32 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. First W.
State Bank, 491 F.2d 780, 786 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974); 18 U.S.C. § 6002
(1976).
76. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). In Kastigar the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the use immunity statutes only because they prevented any use of the compelled
response in a prosecution against the invoker. As long as any direct or indirect prosecutorial use of the
response in the civil suit is possible, whether as evidence, clues, or guides to strategy, the invoking
must be sustained. See also New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 456-57 (1979); Murphy v. Water-
front Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 430 (1956).
77. See infra pp. 1100-02.
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C. Advantages Secured by the Privilege
The privilege's many opportunities for use and its resistance to attack
render it a potent weapon in the hands of civil defendants. By invoking at
every opportunity, defendants and their employees can prevent plaintiffs
from obtaining any discovery from them, except for the documents plain-
tiffs will admittedly obtain from defendant corporations. Worse, those
who invoke during discovery may convince the court at trial that since
they plan to invoke again the plaintiff should not be allowed to call them
to testify or to inform the jury that they had invoked previously.78 Worse
yet, if the plaintiff manages to establish a prima facie case at trial through
other evidence, those who invoked earlier may then waive the privilege in
order to testify as defense witnesses.79
A defense strategy calling for defendants and their officers and employ-
ees to invoke at every opportunity before trial yields several other advan-
tages. By forcing plaintiffs to seek evidence from sources other than the
defendants and their staffs, it increases plaintiffs' expenses and delays
their progress.80 Such delays, in addition to their usual benefits, enable
78. There is substantial support for the notion that attorneys and judges should not allow the
factfinder to learn that a witness has invoked or plans to invoke the privilege. Proposed Rule 513 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence provided:
(a) Comment or inference not permitted. The claim of a privilege, whether in the present
proceeding or upon a prior occasion, is not a proper subject of comment by judge or counsel.
No inference may be drawn therefrom.
(b) Claiming privilege without knowledge of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be con-
ducted, to the extent practicable, so as to facilitate the making of claims of privilege without
the knowledge of the jury.
(c) Jury instruction. Upon request, any party against whom the jury might draw an adverse
inference from a claim of privilege is entitled to an instruction that no inference may be drawn
therefrom.
Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 260 (1973). Congress
rejected Proposed Rule 513 on unrelated grounds. See 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE § 501[01][02] (1981). Among the states that have enacted Proposed Rule 513 are Arkan-
sas, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma and South Dakota. Id.
Further, the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE
PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 7.6(c) (1970) provides:
(c) It is unprofessional conduct for a lawyer to call a witness who he knows will claim a valid
privilege not to testify, for the purpose of impressing upon the jury the fact of the claim of
privilege.
79. When witnesses who invoke at a deposition try to waive the privilege at trial, the plaintiff
must hope the judge will use his discretion to bar their trial testimony or at least to require them to
submit first to a deposition at which they waive the privilege. The latter approach, however, puts the
plaintiff in a worse position than if the deponents had waived the privilege earlier, for he may lack the
time after this eleventh-hour deposition to prepare an effective attack on the ensuing trial testimony.
This possibility of delayed waiver adds an element of uncertainty that works to the defendant's advan-
tage. See infra pp. 1130-31.
80. Of the "dilatory and obfuscatory practices that now apparently flourish" in civil antitrust
litigation, NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES 27
(1979), use of the privilege against self-incrimination is one of the worst. Yet these private antitrust
actions contribute significantly to an effective national antitrust policy. The plaintiff, as a "private
attorney general," is seeking to redress not just a private wrong but a public wrong. NATIONAL COM-
MISSION TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 242 (1955).
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invokers siding with the defense to buy time in which to decide whether to
waive the privilege and testify. If they do decide to testify and submit to
depositions, the delays will have allowed them to see the other evidence
the plaintiff has gathered and to tailor their versions of events accordingly.
By limiting plaintiffs' discovery and increasing their risk of failure, this
defense strategy also puts plaintiffs in a poor position to negotiate a
favorable settlement or prepare for trial.
The strategy may also yield less direct benefits. For instance, it may
sharply reduce the expenses, especially in attorney and employee time,
that defendants incur in responding to plaintiffs' discovery. It may also
contain the disruptive impact of plaintiffs' case on the day-to-day opera-
tions of a defendant company.
Should a plaintiff push on to trial, the strategy may cause a failure of
proof. In price-fixing conspiracies, for example, the strategy is likely to
cause a failure of proof when the defendants and their staffs have kept
knowledge of the conspiracy to themselves and have carefully refrained
from leaving any evidence of the conspiracy in company documents. In
short, defendants' full exploitation of this constitutional privilege may
deny plaintiffs any opportunity for meaningful access to the courts, an
opportunity that is itself becoming a right worthy of constitutional
status. "
II. The Modest Need for the Privilege in Civil Cases
All evidentiary privileges prevent untrammeled discovery. They under-
mine to some degree the trial system's capacity to ascertain the truth. 2
They do so in order to further other policies considered more important.
This part briefly examines the extent to which the policies behind the
privilege are advanced when the privilege is invoked in private civil cases.
Then we may determine whether these policies are offended if the plain-
tiff is provided some remedy when the privilege is used against him.
The language of the privilege suggests that the Framers intended it to
operate only in criminal cases: "No person. . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." 3 Madison's original lan-
81. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419-22 (1974) (ban against attorney-client inter-
views conducted by law students or legal paraprofessionals constituted unjustifiable restriction on in-
mates' rights of access to courts); California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508,
510 (1972) (right of access to courts is one aspect of constitutional right to petition government).
82. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has emphasized the need for narrow interpretation. United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974) (presidential claim of privilege outweighed by need for
evidence in criminal trial); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1972) (reporters have no First
Amendment privilege to conceal facts from grand jury). See also In re Cueto, 554 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir.
1977) (lay ministers possess no privilege to refuse to answer grand jury questions).
83. U.S. CONST. amend. V. In contrast, the language of most of the other protections established
by the Fifth Amendment, such as the due process guarantee, are not limited by their terms to criminal
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guage, which provided that "no person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself," might have allowed the privilege in civil cases, but it was
amended with little debate in the House.84 In any event, neither the lan-
guage of the privilege nor the Framers' intent has governed in Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence: "The history of the privilege does not settle
the policy of the privilege." 5 Because the rule that the privilege must be
available in civil cases is now too well settled to admit discussion, 86 we
turn to the policies only to see whether they would be offended by al-
lowing the plaintiff a remedy when the privilege is used against him.
The policies that the privilege has been said to promote87 apply with
less force in civil cases between private parties than in criminal cases. One
purpose of the privilege is to discourage the government from browbeating
and torturing criminal suspects in order to obtain confessions.88 This goal
operates most forcefully when the government's motive for torture or
browbeating is keenest. Hence the privilege is needed during station-house
proceedings.
84. A delegate to the Constitutional Convention objected to Madison's clause on these grounds:
it contained a general declaration, in some degree contrary to laws passed. He alluded to that
part where a person shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself. He thought it
ought to be confined to criminal cases, and moved an amendment for that purpose; which
amendment being adopted, the clause as amended was unanimously agreed to .
I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 782 U. Gales ed. 1834).
85. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 31, § 2251, at 295.
86. See McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924). The privilege is also available during
legislative investigations, see Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 188 (1957), and juvenile pro-
ceedings, see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967).
87. Many policies have been thought to support the privilege. Justice Goldberg, writing for the
Supreme Court in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964), identified seven: (1) our
fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; (2) our
distrust of self-deprecatory statements; (3) our sense of fair play, which dictates "'a fair state-individ-
ual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for
disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the
entire load'" (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 31, § 2251, at 317); (4) our preference for an
accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; (5) our unwillingness to subject
those suspected of a crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt; (6) our
respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each person "'to a private
enclave where he may lead a private life'" (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-
82 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957)); and (7) our realization that the
privilege, while sometimes a "'shelter to the guilty,' " is often " 'a protection to the innocent,' " (quot-
ing Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955)). The Court no longer seriously contends that a
purpose of the privilege is to protect the innocent. See Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S.
406, 415 (1966).
As Judge Friendly, among others, has pointed out, the first six stated policies reduce to four: (1) a
desire to discourage inhumane treatment and abuses by the government; (2) a desire to maintain the
appropriate state-individual balance of advantages; (3) a desire to avoid subjecting persons to the cruel
trilemma of self-accusations, perjury, or contempt; and (4) a desire to protect the private enclave.
Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L.
REV. 671, 686-87 (1968).
To a large extent later commentators have built on the original analysis of Jeremy Bentham. See
Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in 7 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 446-47 U. Bowr-
ing ed. 1843).
88. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 48, § 118, at 251.
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interrogations of persons in custody; it establishes that a suspect must be
told of his right to remain silent and renders any coerced statements and
the fruits of such statements inadmissible as evidence. The privilege is also
needed during grand jury investigations and criminal trials in order to
prevent prosecutors from browbeating witnesses into confessing criminal
conduct. In a private civil action, by contrast, the government lacks any
opportunity for coercion, and this policy simply does not operate.
The use of the privilege as a prophylactic measure against government
browbeating and torture is one of the so-called "foxhunter" policies of the
privilege because it aims at influencing the government's methods of inves-
tigating and prosecuting crime." Another fox-hunter policy is to en-
courage government investigators to gather evidence of criminal conduct
supposedly more reliable than confessions." This policy seeks to spur into
action any disciples of that fabled Indian policeman who explained his
reliance on confessions as follows: "It is far easier to lie in the shade and
rub red pepper in the poor devil's eyes than to go out in the sun hunting
for evidence." 9 This policy is furthered in part by preventing the govern-
ment from requiring criminal defendants to testify and by allowing any
person to refuse to incriminate himself when questioned by government
investigators.
In one sense this policy does not operate at all in civil cases between
private parties. Even if the privilege were not available there, the govern-
ment would not be the one seeking to compel self-incriminating testimony
in order to avoid its burden of independent investigation. In another sense,
however, any measures likely to induce potential invokers in a civil case to
admit self-incriminating evidence may reduce the government's need to
search elsewhere for evidence. 2 But even assuming there is a policy
89. See O'Brien, The Fifth Amendment: Fox Hunters, Old Women, Hermits, and the Burger
Court, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 26 (1978).
90. In Garner v. United States, a case upholding the admission in evidence of incriminating dis-
closures on tax returns, the Court suggested that this policy is not implicated in private civil cases:
[T]he fundamental purpose of the Fifth Amendment [is] the preservation of an adversary sys-
tem of criminal justice.. . . That system is undermined when a government deliberately seeks
to avoid the burdens of independent investigation by compelling self-incriminating disclosures.
In areas where a government cannot be said to be compelling such information, however, there
is no such circumvention of the constitutionally mandated policy of adversary criminal
proceedings.
424 U.S. 648, 655-56 (1976) (citation omitted).
91. 1 J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 442 n.1 (1883).
92. If the privilege were not available at all in civil cases, government investigators would be
tempted to pressure persons to sue suspects in order to use the self-incriminatory evidence gathered for
subsequent criminal prosecution. But if the government uses civil discovery to circumvent the limits on
criminal discovery, the evidence it obtains may be suppressed under the due process clause. E.g.,
United States v. Parrott, 248 F. Supp. 196, 199-202 (D.D.C. 1965). Cf Silver v. McCamey, 221
F.2d 873, 874-875 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (administrative license revocation hearing may not be held while
criminal charge against same person and arising out of same incident is pending because disclosure of
evidence necessary for defense of hearing may prejudice defense of criminal trial).
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against aiding the government in this manner, giving the plaintiff some
remedy in a civil case should not produce an undue amount of unreliable
self-incriminatory evidence. Persons genuinely concerned about their
criminal exposure will probably continue to invoke in the civil case.
Moreover, any incriminating testimony a potential invoker gives during
civil litigation is more likely to be reliable than the coerced confessions
this policy seeks to avoid. The testimony, after all, will be uttered in a
relatively formal proceeding by a person who has had time to consider the
implications of his statements.
Another fox-hunter policy behind the privilege is to maintain in crimi-
nal cases the proper "state-individual balance," a balance that historically
removes any burden from the criminal defendant and requires the govern-
ment "to shoulder the entire load" in establishing guilt.3 The underlying
goal is to maintain the adversarial character of criminal procedure. This
policy is reflected in the rule, derived from the privilege, allowing the
defendant in a criminal case to refuse to take the stand. Taken to the
extreme, the policy would allow the accused to refuse to cooperate in any
way in his prosecution. He could refuse to appear in lineups or to provide
handwriting samples, blood samples, or fingerprints. Nevertheless, all
these involuntary actions through which the accused provides evidence in-
criminating himself have been compelled.9 4 Even "testimonial" incrimina-
tory evidence of minor importance has been compelled.95 In short, the pol-
icy as stated has never been pushed to its logical limit.
Removing the privilege altogether from private civil cases would not
reduce the adversarial character of criminal proceedings. The current pro-
cedures and allocation of responsibilities would continue unaltered. To be
sure, the broader goal of limiting the government's power over individuals
would be affected if the privilege were not available in civil proceedings
involving the government. Indeed, if the privilege did not apply in civil tax
investigations, deportation hearings, and licensing hearings, for example,
government agents conducting these non-criminal proceedings could easily
circumvent the adversarial criminal procedures. But even this broader goal
of the state-individual policy is not implicated in civil cases between pri-
vate parties.
The policy that applies with the most force in private civil cases is
93. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 31, § 2251, at 317.
94. See, e.g., Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266, 272 (1967) (handwriting exemplars and
appearance in lineup); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood sample); see also
Friendly, supra note 87, at 703-05 (discussing constitutionality of taking body evidence); Note, Con-
stitutional Limitations on the Taking of Body Evidence, 78 YALE L.J. 1074 (1969) (same).
95. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410-414 (1976) (compelling implied admis-
sion of possession of accountant's workpapers); California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971) (compelling
disclosure of name and address after involvement in auto accident).
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known as the "old woman's policy. 96 It reflects the desire to avoid forcing
a person to face the "cruel trilemma" of choosing among incrimination,
perjury, or contempt.97 The privilege allows the person from whom an
incriminatory response is sought to escape this trilemma. Of course, if
cruelty is the concern, one might question why it'is permissible to force
parents to incriminate children or to force persons to reveal information
that is highly damaging but not incriminatory. Apparently, the "old wo-
man's policy" assumes that forcing self-incriminatory testimony is signifi-
cantly more cruel than forcing any other testimony.98
A defendant or a witness in a civil case who must respond to a discov-
ery request may indeed face this trilemma. He cannot ensure that an in-
criminatory response will not reach the government and be used to prose-
cute him.9 The cruelty of the trilemma will vary with the circumstances,
however. The cruelty will virtually dissolve when the danger of prosecu-
tion based on the incriminatory response is remote, for the privilege pro-
tects only against penal sanctions. 110 It does not protect against the cruelty
arising from stigmatizing oneself as a criminal or from exposing oneself to
civil liability, however massive."' Accordingly, although this policy will
sometimes apply with as much force in civil cases as in criminal, it does
not apply when the plaintiff is able to establish that the invoker faces no
practical danger of prosecution.
The desire to avoid the cruel trilemma suggests another reason for al-
96. The responsibility for this label lies with Bentham. Bentham, supra note 87. Apparently he
believed the cruelty of the trilemma facing one whose answer would incriminate himself would only
offend old women.
97. Friendly, supra note 87, at 686. Professor McNaughton has characterized this policy as the
desire to avoid forcing witnesses to "choose among the three horns of the triceratops." McNaughton,
supra note 1, at 147.
98. In Dean Griswold's words:
[W]e do not make even the most hardened criminal sign his own death warrant, or dig his own
grave, or pull the lever that springs the trap on which he stands. We have through the course
of history developed a considerable feeling of the dignity and intrinsic importance of the indi-
vidual man.
Griswold, supra note 1, at 503. See generally O'Brien, supra note 89, at 41-45 (discussing "old wo-
man's policy").
99. Of course the trilemma facing a witness in a civil case would be more cruel, and the fox-
hunter policies implicated as well, except for the rule that a witness who waives the privilege in the
civil case may nevertheless invoke it during a later criminal proceeding. See United States v. Miranti,
253 F.2d 135, 139 (2d Cir. 1958); Stone v. State, 85 Wash. 2d 342, 534 P.2d 1022 (1975); 8 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 31, at 470-72.
100. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972).
101. A person may not invoke simply because his response would be degrading, subject him to
scorn, cause mental anguish, betray a non-privileged confidence, injure friends, or subject him to civil
liability, loss of employment, or disqualification from certain professions. The privilege is only availa-
ble when the response would tend to incriminate. See Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 430-31
(1956) (privilege does not protect witnesses from "loss of job, expulsion from labor unions, state
registration and investigation statutes, passport eligibility, and general public opprobrium"); Brown v.
Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 598 (1896) (answer may be compelled despite its tendency to disgrace witness
or bring him into disrepute).
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lowing the privilege at least at civil depositions and trials. Without the
privilege, the private counsel asking the questions will be able to browbeat
a deponent or a witness in order to force him to confess criminal conduct.
Of course, hostile and cruel interrogations often occur at depositions even
when the privilege is available. Deponents cross swords with interrogators
for many reasons besides fear of incrimination. But browbeating to coerce
incriminatory admissions is, according to the policy against the cruel
trilemma, a significantly more repulsive spectacle than browbeating for
other aims. Nor will it necessarily become less repulsive when the interro-
gator is a private litigant rather than a public official.
Thus, unlike the other policies behind the privilege, 0 " the "old wo-
man's" policy does apply with significant force in private civil cases. But
the cruel trilemma will be avoided as long as the privilege is available in
the civil case, regardless of the remedies allowed to reduce the disadvan-
tage to the plaintiff. Since the cruelty this policy seeks to avoid is only the
cruelty of being forced to increase one's criminal exposure, remedies for
invoking that only increase the civil exposure of the invoker or his em-
ployer do not offend any policy behind the privilege.
III. Remedies
We have seen that the desire to avoid the "cruel trilemma," if nothing
else, requires that the privilege remain available in civil cases. We have
also seen, however, that the policies behind the privilege do not preclude
devising remedies to help the party who is stymied by its use.
In fact, the willingness of courts to devise remedies has turned less on
policy considerations than on whether the invoker is identified with the
plaintiff or the defendant. Certainly courts have shown no hesitation to
assist defendants when the person invoking the privilege in a civil case is
the plaintiff or the plaintiffs employee.' The most common judicial re-
sponse is to dismiss the plaintiff's action. Indeed, when plaintiffs invoke,
most discussions center on whether the action should automatically be dis-
102. At various times the privilege has been said to serve policies besides the "foxhunter" policies
and the policy of avoiding the cruel trilemma. Debate has centered on the "hermits" policy, which
seeks to protect that "private enclave where [each] may lead a private life." United States v. Grune-
wald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957). For a
brief period the Court considered this the primacy policy of the privilege. See Tehan v. United States
ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415-16 (1966); McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967
SUP. CT. REV. 193, 210. But the privacy policy has not survived scrutiny. See Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391, 399-401 (1976); Friendly, supra note 87, at 687-90.
In a forthcoming article I attempt to explain more fully why the privilege is an unsuitable vehicle
for protecting privacy. Whether allowing a remedy to private plaintiffs stymied by the privilege would
offend privacy concerns is doubtful in any event.
103. E.g., Lyons v. Johnson, 415 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1969) (dismissing suit), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1027 (1970); Brown v. Ames, 446 F. Supp. 1176 (D. Minn. 1972) (same).
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missed, or whether less severe measures would occasionally be appropri-
ate.' 4 But when defendants or their employees invoke, courts often neglect
to devise an effective remedy for the plaintiffs.' 5 Some courts refuse to
allow plaintiffs any remedy on the ground that doing so would tend to
make the invoker's exercise of the privilege "costly.' 10 6
This part of the Article examines the range of possible remedies for the
plaintiff.' 7 It concludes that the most effective remedy is to ensure that
when the defendant or his employees invoke during discovery, the plaintiff
will be able to bring that fact to the attention of the jury, to argue
whatever inferences follow from it, and, when necessary, to shift the bur-
den of producing evidence of the defendant's conduct. A court alert to the
obstructive potential of the privilege should also bar those who invoke
during discovery from testifying at trial.
A. Remedies to Reject
Some of the remedies for plaintiffs that have been suggested in the past
are less sound in concept and less effective in practice than others. Nar-
rowing the current standards for an incriminating response so that the
privilege can only be invoked when the invoker is likely to be prosecuted,
or when his response is more incriminating as a matter of degree, merely
replaces the problematic current approach with one that is wholly un-
workable. Granting protective orders is not likely to induce invokers to
respond, nor is it consistent with society's interest in effective law enforce-
ment. Compelling responses on the ground that they are sure to be "de-
rived" from past grants of use immunity distorts the use immunity concept
and allows the court to usurp the prosecutor's authority to control
immunity.
1. Tinkering with Hoffman
As discussed above, the current standards set forth in Hoffman and its
progeny require the court to uphold an invocation of privilege as long as
104. A few courts have felt that dismissing the plaintiffs suit is too severe a sanction for invoking
the privilege. E.g., Campbell v. Gerrans, 592 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1979); Justice v. Laudermilch, 78
F.R.D. 201 (M.D. Pa. 1978). See generally Comment, supra note 2 (discussing sanctions against
plaintiff for invoking privilege).
105. The sharp disparity in treatment accorded invoking plaintiffs and defendants has been criti-
cized. See Wehling v. CBS, 608 F.2d 1084, 1089 n.10 (5th Cir. 1979); Kaminsky, supra note 2, at
149, 153-56.
106. E.g., Frierson v. McIntyre, 151 F. Supp. 5, 6-7 (D. Va. 1953); Mayo v. Ford, 184 A.2d 38,
40 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1962).
107. Unless otherwise indicated, this discussion of remedies applies whether the invoker was the
defendant or the defendant's employee, and regardless of the stage at which the invocation of privilege
occurred. As indicated earlier, a corporate or partnership defendant will not usually be able to invoke
successfully in its answers, replies to interrogatories, or requests for admissions.
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the invoker's response might supply a clue to investigators or a link in a
chain of circumstantial evidence showing some criminal conduct. 108 To
overrule a privilege claim, the challenger must show that it is "'perfectly
clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case,
that the witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possibly have
such tendency to incriminate."109 The invoker need not reveal his re-
sponse, he may show the incriminatory potential through argument rather
than evidence, and he receives the benefit of any doubt. This holds true
even if the invoker has been prosecuted before and even if no practical
danger of future prosecution exists." 0
Judicial efforts to revise these standards are of two types. One approach
would deny the privilege to an invoker in a civil case who could not show
that his response would contribute to a realistic, rather than a theoretical,
danger of prosecution. An alternative approach would require the invoker
to demonstrate more clearly than current standards require that his re-
sponse would materially aid the prosecutor's case should prosecution be
commenced. Whether the revisions focus on the likelihood of prosecution
or on the actual danger of the response, however, the underlying aim is to
grant the privilege only to those who have demonstrated that they will
seriously increase their criminal exposure by responding.
a. Compelling A Response When Prosecution Is Unlikely
The district court in In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation"'
adopted the first approach. The case was a consolidated private civil suit
in which several dozen plaintiffs alleged that a number of defendant cor-
porations had fixed the wholesale and retail prices of folding cartons in
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Like so many private price-
fixing cases, this one came in the wake of the federal prosecution of the
defendants and their executives for the same price-fixing conspiracy. The
criminal case was completed and most of the defendants had pleaded no
contest by the time the plaintiffs in the civil case began deposing employ-
ees of the defendant corporation. Some of these deponents had been prose-
cuted by the Justice Department. Most had invoked the privilege and had
received use immunity for testifying in the grand jury investigation that
led to the earlier indictment. Nevertheless, these deponents invoked the
privilege in response to nearly every question of the civil plaintiffs.
Had the district court adhered to Hoffman, it would have upheld these
invokings: the court recognized the incriminating character of the re-
108. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951).
109. Id. at 488 (quoting Temple v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 892 (1881)) (emphasis omitted).
110. See supra pp. 1066, 1071-80.
111. 465 F. Supp. 618 (N.D. Ill.), vacated, 609 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1979).
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sponses that would have been compelled but for the privilege.112 It also
noted that the statute of limitations had not run on the crimes for which
the responses might have provided evidence."' Nor did double jeopardy or
past grants of use immunity necessarily preclude future prosecution of
these deponents. Clearly the theoretical possibility that the responses could
be used in future prosecutions still existed.
The court nevertheless refused to uphold these invocations of privilege
concluding that the threat of prosecution of these deponents was too re-
mote.' 4 The court based this conclusion on several facts: the federal prose-
cution of the conspiracy had been completed, no state criminal investiga-
tion of the price-fixing in question was in progress, and any future
prosecutor of the deponents given use immunity would face substantial
difficulty in showing that his case did not use directly or indirectly any
information derived from their immunized grand jury testimony."1 5
Although reversed on appeal, the district court's rejection of the rule
that a mere possibility of prosecution allows one to invoke deserves serious
consideration. First, the court's approach confronts the full implications of
the "possibility" rule:
Strong policy considerations support the result reached here. Federal
and state criminal statutes have an expansive and omnipresent sweep
in modern society. There are a multitude of situations where poten-
tial criminal and civil liability overlap. Sustaining a civil witness's
refusal to testify on fifth amendment grounds every time an answer
might give rise to some theoretically possible future criminal prose-
cution, no matter how remote, would signal a virtual end to discov-
ery in civil cases. Assertions of the fifth amendment which, as a
practical matter, are frivolous should not be allowed to frustrate dis-
covery in civil cases.116
Second, as discussed earlier, a deponent who does not face a realistic dan-
ger of prosecution is not subjected to the cruel trilemma of incrimination,
perjury or contempt.' 7 Hence the primary policy for allowing use of the
privilege in civil cases does not operate with force in such a case.
Nevertheless, the district court's approach creates as many difficulties as
112. 465 F. Supp. at 621-22.
113. Id. at 622.
114. Id. at 622-23.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 625. Other courts have suggested similar approaches. E.g., Priebe v. World Ventures,
Inc., 407 F. Supp. 1244, 1246 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (dictum) (privilege cannot be invoked without dem-
onstration of real and appreciable risk of self-incrimination); In re Duckett, 76 Cal. App. 3d 692, 143
Cal. Rptr. 199 (1978) (privilege is unavailable absent reasonable apprehension testimony could lead
to criminal prosecution).
117. See supra p. 1086 & note 100.
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it resolves. First, any future prosecutor of the invoker at the state or fed-
eral level will need to show that he made no use of the compelled re-
sponse,11 a burden "heavy" in theory and often crushing in fact.119 The
difficulty of meeting this burden is one reason the immunity statutes at the
state and federal level permit only the executive branch to initiate grants
of use immunity.2 ' Yet by compelling the invoking deponent to answer,
the court in effect grants use immunity for the testimony without any
clearance from the prosecution.
Second, a judge will rarely be able to hold with confidence that the
possibility of future prosecution is negligible. This is particularly true
when no criminal charges have been brought at the time of the invoking
and the incriminating information is apparently not known to the govern-
ment. The district court in In re Fol&ng Carton held an unusually
favorable vantage point for seeing that no future prosecution of the invok-
ers was likely. The federal Antitrust Division had completed its misde-
meanor criminal case charging a conspiracy to fix the prices of folding
cartons that lasted until December 1974.11 Some of the deponents had
been defendants in that criminal case. Others had been granted use immu-
nity for their testimony in the grand jury proceedings leading to that in-
dictment. 22 Those familiar with the practices of the Antitrust Division
could safely predict that it would not begin another prosecution against
those officials for their participation in a conspiracy to fix the price of
folding cartons. Nor did the states with jurisdiction to prosecute seem
likely to do so. 123 State price-fixing prosecutions duplicating federal prose-
cutions have been rare. State prosecutors would face the same difficulty as
federal prosecutors in overcoming the effects of the previous grants of im-
munity.'24 Although state prosecutors had presumably known about the
federal case for many months, none had shown an interest in proceeding.
118. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 461-62 (1972).
119. See United States v. Barker, 542 F.2d 479, 484 n.9 (8th Cir. 1976) (burden of proving no
use may be "extraordinary"). The future prosecutor must demonstrate that all of the evidence he
seeks to use has been derived from sources independent of the immunized testimony. See United States
v. Seiffert, 501 F.2d 974, 982 (5th Cir. 1974). This includes showing the immunized testimony has
not been used in cross-examination, New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979), or for non-eviden-
tiary goals, such as preparing trial strategy. United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1973).
The burden of proof imposed by the court may be substantial. See United States v. Henderson, 406
F. Supp. 417, 423 (D. Del. 1975) (assuming government must show beyond a reasonable doubt that
evidence was derived solely from 'independent, legitimate' sources); United States v. BirreIl, 269 F.
Supp. 716, 725 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (requiring clear and convincing proof); Strachan, Self-Incrimi-
nation, Immunity, and Watergate, 56 TEX. L. REV. 791, 830 (1978) (requirement of proof stronger
than preponderance of evidence).
120. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1976) (requiring motion from U.S. Attorney for immunity order);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2011.01 (1979) (requiring motion from county attorney for immunity order).
121. 465 F. Supp. at 621-22.
122. Id. at 626.
123. Id. at 622.
124. Id. at 623.
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But even in this case the district court could not be confident that the
deponents would not be prosecuted for the past acts their responses might
reveal. The deponents, especially those who had not received use immu-
nity, might still have been prosecuted for fixing prices of products other
than folding cartons. In fact, the invokers claimed grand jury investiga-
tions of price-fixing on paper cartons and milk cartons were in progress at
the time. And historically the Antitrust Division has been willing to bring
multiple prosecutions based on closely related conduct that amounts to
participation in more than one price-fixing conspiracy. " ' The court
should at least have evaluated the chance that the grand jury investiga-
tions of possible price-fixing of other products would lead to prosecution
of these deponents.
Even if the court could have been sure that no criminal antitrust
charges would be brought, incriminating information provided by the de-
ponents' responses might have triggered prosecution for other crimes. For
instance, the federal authorities might have considered criminal charges if
the information given by the deponents showed that some had committed
perjury before the grand jury. Or the information might have provided
evidence or investigatory clues for crimes wholly unrelated to price-fixing.
Because a court must either uphold or overrule a privilege claim at a time
when it may not know the invoker's full response or all the crimes for
which the response may incriminate him, it can hardly predict with confi-
dence whether all prosecutors able to do so will opt not to prosecute for
these separate crimes. Attempting to assess how state and federal prosecu-
tors and their successors will exercise their discretion to prosecute, and
upholding or overruling an invoking based on that assessment, is as un-
seemly and speculative an endeavor for the courts as one could create.
b. Altering the Standards for Finding Incriminating Potential
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court in a
manner suggesting a second way of altering Hoffman.' Although the
court reiterated that a mere possibility of prosecution was a sufficient dan-
ger to trigger Fifth Amendment protection, it did not uphold the depo-
nent's privilege claims outright. Instead, it remanded the case, instructing
125. Compare United States v. Hawaiian Conference of Tour Operators, No. 609 (D. Hawaii
filed Oct. 5, 1975) (defendant indicted for fixing prices of Free Independent Tour packages to Ha-
waii) with United States v. Hawaiian Holidays Inc., No. 922 (D. Hawaii filed Oct. 2, 1976) (same
defendant, after conviction on earlier charge indicted for fixing prices on Group Inclusive Tour pack-
ages to Hawaii). See also United States v. H.E. Koontz Creamery, 257 F. Supp. 295, 297-98 (D. Md.
1966) (defendant dairy owners, convicted of rigging bids for school milk contracts from 1959 to 1960,
were subsequently indicted for fixing resale and wholesale milk prices in same town from 1956 to
1960).
126. In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig. (Appeal of Brown), 609 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1979).
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the district court to demand a better showing from the deponents that
their responses would be incriminating. 127
The Seventh Circuit's approach is only one of several ways that a court
might ease Hoffman's standards by focusing on the incriminating nature
of the response rather than on the likelihood of prosecution. A court could
require the invoker to indicate what his response would be, or refuse to
grant the invoker the benefit of all doubts. Again, it might narrow the
notion of an incriminating response to include only responses that on their
face show criminal conduct. This would exclude responses that only pro-
vide clues or circumstantial evidence. Finally, a court might protect only
responses likely to play a substantial role in a later prosecution of the
invoker; responses generating evidence likely to be cumulative or to estab-
lish matters not in serious dispute could be compelled.
These reformulations of Hoffman present serious difficulties, however.
First, despite recent ambiguous decisions 12 the long-term trend of Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence that culminated in the present standards re-
flects an evolving awareness of the need to consider incriminating a wide
variety of responses. Until roughly the turn of the century, some courts
upheld the privilege only when the response would admit, if not an entire
crime, then at least an element of a crime. 1 9 Under this standard, how-
ever, a careful questioner, by compelling responses that would provide cir-
cumstantial evidence or clues, could force a witness to prove a case against
himself and thwart the policies behind the privilege. In Ward v. State for
127. Id. at 873.
128. A number of recent Supreme Court cases support to some extent these reformulations of the
Hoffman standard. The notion that responses on their face must provide incriminatory evidence, and
not merely circumstantial evidence or investigatory leads, gains support from Zicarelli v. New Jersey
State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972). In that case the Court held that an immunized
witness's response admitting his Cosa Nostra responsibilities in certain geographic areas in the United
States would not incriminate him under foreign law. Id. at 478-81. The Court did not even consider
the obvious possibility that his answers would provide circumstantial evidence or investigatory leads
helpful in a foreign prosecution.
The notion that the response must provide incriminating evidence likely to be of practical value in a
later prosecution gains support from Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). In Fisher, the
Court observed that the production of documents in response to a subpoena, while impliedly admitting
the possession of the documents, merely provided cumulative evidence of their possession. Thus, pro-
duction could not be avoided by claiming the privilege. Id. at 396-401. The clear suggestion was that
lower courts, in assessing claims of privilege, should assess the practical value of the response to
prosecutors, See also Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968) ("The central standard for
the privilege's application has been whether the claimant is confronted by substantial and 'real,' and
not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination."); United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S.
115, 128 (1980) (quoting Marchetti with approval). These statements may presage a major restriction
of Hoffman's standard for an incriminating response.
129. E.g., In re Briggs, 135 N.C. 118, 145, 47 S.E. 403, 411 (1904); State v. Duffy, 15 Iowa 425,
426 (1863).
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), made clear that in the federal system an answer
need not admit an element of a crime to be incriminating. See also United States v. St. Pierre, 132
F.2d 837, 838 (2d Cir. 1942) (discussing Counselman).
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example, a grand jury witness was compelled to answer the question:
"Tell who bet at the game of Faro, not naming yourself.""' Plainly, the
ability to answer combined with the circumstance that the illegal games
were held in secret would provide circumstantial evidence that the witness
attended and knew the game of Faro was being played. The answer
would also provide damaging clues since the bettors named could be con-
tacted and forced to incriminate the witness. Surely the extension of the
privilege to protect circumstantial evidence and dues represents an ad-
vance needed to keep the privilege meaningful. 13t
But if it is illogical to uphold the privilege only when the response on
its face would show criminal conduct, it is unworkable to tie the availabil-
ity of the privilege to an assessment of how incriminating, as a matter of
degree, the response would be. We have seen that under Hoffman the
court must often decide whether the response may be incriminating at a
time when it lacks information to do more than speculate. Yet under a
reformulation limiting protection to a response that is significantly incrim-
inating, even more is expected of the court. A still more demanding stan-
dard that would uphold the privilege only when the incriminating evi-
dence is likely to provide practical assistance to the prosecution would
require the court to anticipate the strengths and weaknesses of the future
prosecutor's case. Consider the dilemma of a judge in a routine divorce
case when a deponent-defendant asked about his assets invokes on the
ground that his response might suggest he had received income not re-
ported on his tax return. The invoker, while asserting his innocence of a
tax offense, may claim the response would help a future prosecutor mount
a misguided case against him. The judge must then attempt to anticipate
the strengths and weaknesses of that misguided case and the role this re-
sponse would play. And because the availability of the privilege must be
assessed question by question at the civil deposition,3 each new question
and invocation of the privilege will require new decisions."3 At least the
Hoffman standard led to a predictable result-the invoker always won.
Finally, none of the revisions constitutes an effective solution for the
plaintiff when the defendant or his employees have been involved in a
crime. The greater their involvement, the easier it will be for them to
show that their answers would incriminate under any test. If pressed for a
better showing that their responses will incriminate, they will oblige. The
plaintiff still confronts the anomaly that the greater the criminal liability
of the defense, the more easily it may block his discovery.
130. 2 Mo. 120, 122 (1829).
131. See Ratner, supra note 43, at 480-91.
132. See supra note 52.
133. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. The Tug Kate Malloy, 291 F. Supp. 816, 818 (E.D. La. 1968).
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2. Protective Orders
A few commentators have suggested that the astute use of protective
orders offers the best solution when defendants or their employees invoke
during a civil case.134 A protective order would apply most often to deposi-
tions, but might apply to any response to discovery that could have been
avoided by the privilege. The order would keep these responses away from
the government by forbidding their disclosure to anyone except persons
designated in the order, usually the plaintiff and his attorney. With such
an order, the notion seems to be, the defendants and their employees will
be willing to waive the privilege and respond to the discovery requests.
One obvious factor prevents this approach from opening up discovery.
The approach relies entirely on the potential invokers' willingness to
waive the privilege in return for a protective order, for the order itself
does not allow a court to compel the invoker to respond. Kastigar v.
United States established that before a witness who claims the privilege
can be compelled to respond, he must be provided with an order that dis-
places the need for the privilege entirely.' A use immunity order satisfies
Kastigar only because it assures the invoker that his response will not be
used directly or indirectly to prosecute him. Hence, his response will not
under any circumstances increase his chance of being convicted in a crimi-
nal case. A protective order in a civil case carries no similar assurance.
Such an order allows the response, or at least information derived from
the response, to spill out at trial, appeal, or some other hearing, where it
could be discovered and later used by prosecutors. No protective order
could provide the absolute protection that Kastigar requires against direct
or indirect use by prosecutors. The court can hardly hold all proceed-
ings-including the trial and the appeal-in secret, seal all records indefi-
nitely, and prevent all participants from supplying information to the
government.
If a protective order barred the plaintiff from using the response in any
hearing to which the government might obtain access, it would force the
plaintiff to refrain from offering any evidence that might be said to be
derived directly or indirectly from the response. It would put plaintiffs
preparing for trial in an absurd position.
In any event, no matter how sweeping the protective order, the danger
exists that the other parties or their counsel may violate it and convey to
the government the information the witness has provided. If the govern-
134. See Donnici, supra note 2, at 16; Note, Constitutional Law, supra note 2, at 248; Note,
Resolving Tensions Between Constitutional Rights: Use Immunity in Concurrent or Related Proceed-
ings, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 674 (1976).
135. 406 U.S. 441, 459-61 (1972).
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ment was allowed to use this information, then the protective order would
not have displaced the need for the privilege. But if the government was
not allowed to use this information, then as a practical matter the person
leaking the information may have crippled the government's capacity to
prosecute."3
6
Federal antitrust prosecutors will probably be able to obtain any in-
criminating responses given under protective orders in private civil cases
without even waiting for a hearing or a leak. In United States v. GAF
Corporation,'37 the Second Circuit, citing the Antitrust Civil Process Act
of 1976,138 enforced a civil investigative demand (CID) from the Justice
Department for discovery responses obtained by plaintiffs in a civil anti-
trust suit, despite a protective order barring the parties from allowing ac-
cess to the responses.' According to the Second Circuit, the courts have
the discretion to refuse enforcement of CID's in some instances. 4 But as
long as the invoker in a civil suit faces the mere possibility that his re-
sponse will reach the government and be used directly or indirectly in a
criminal case against him, the Kastigar requirements will not be met and
a response cannot be compelled.
The court's inability to compel an incriminatory response would not
necessarily negate the value of the protective order if in fact the order
persuaded potential invokers in a civil suit to waive the privilege and re-
spond. From the perspective of the potential invoker, however, the relative
costs and benefits of invoking or waiving the privilege are not significantly
altered by a protective order.
Presumably the major asserted benefit of the protective order is that it
reduces the danger that waiving and responding in the civil suit will lead
to criminal prosecution. The order lessens the chance that an incriminat-
ing discovery response will be brought to the attention of the govern-
ment. 4 ' With a protective order there is less danger, for example, that the
136. The leaking of the compelled response would require future prosecutors to show that they
made no use of the response. For an assessment of the difficulty of meeting this burden, see supra p.
1091 & notes 118-20.
137. 596 F.2d 10, 16 (2d Cir. 1979).
138. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1312 (West 1982).
139. See Martindell v. ITT, 594 F.2d 291, 297 n.8 (2d Cir. 1979) (granting of government's
request to modify protective order in private case lies within trial court's discretion).
140. 596 F.2d at 16.
141. Even when the government's attention has been drawn to the conduct of the defendants and
their employees, the protective order slightly reduces the extent to which waiving and responding in
the civil suit helps the government build its criminal case. Because of the protective order, the would-
be criminal targets who provided the responses would have a stronger argument for resisting govern-
ment subpoenas or CIDs aimed at obtaining the responses from the plaintiff. As in Martindell v.
ITT, 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979), they will argue that the protective order, which was clearly
designed to suppress the response from the government, gave them a legitimate expectation that it
would be enforced and that they only waived the privilege and responded in reliance on that expecta-
tion. The prospect that future deponents will always invoke unless the protective orders are consist-
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plaintiff's attorney will send incriminating deposition answers to the gov-
ernment with an explanation of their significance. In the same way, the
protective order, by keeping the responses from the attention of other po-
tential plaintiffs, should limit the increase in civil exposure that may re-
sult from waiving and responding. The order should also reduce the possi-
ble collateral consequences of incriminating responses, such as damage to
the potential invoker's reputation.
On closer examination, however, these purported benefits lose much of
their value.' When civil liability arises from incriminatory acts, much of
the evidence showing the illegal acts should eventually surface at trial,
even if effectively suppressed before then. The evidence revealed at trial is
as likely to flag the attention of prosecutors and other potential plaintiffs
and to harm the deponent's reputation as the original discovery responses.
Consequently, a protective order merely ensures that the circulation of
the incriminating responses will be limited temporarily. 4' It is therefore
likely to induce a waiver and response only from those seeking to suppress
their response temporarily. But temporary suppression should not appeal
to many, for the damage to reputation and the other collateral conse-
quences from distributing the response remain even if the temporary sup-
pression reduces criminal exposure.
No doubt instances will also arise when the incriminating responses
sought in a deposition or other discovery device do not relate to important
matters in the civil action. Then the witness may realize that the trial and
other hearings will bypass the responses altogether, with the result that
the protective order will limit the circulation of the incriminatory re-
sponses permanently. The same result often occurs when the case settles
before trial. Here again the person whose primary concern centers on lim-
iting the circulation of his incriminatory responses may be induced by the
ently enforced also supports their claim. Moreover, the government can obtain the information by
giving them immunity. All these factors may persuade the court to refuse enforcement of the govern-
ment subpoenas or CIDs.
But despite any such "reliance" on the protective order, the Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-349, 94 Stat. 1154 (1980) (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.),
may be construed to require the trial court to enforce government CID requests for depositions and
other responses to discovery. The Act states in part: "[An express demand for any product of discov-
ery supersedes any inconsistent order . . . preventing or restraining disclosure of such product of
discovery to any person ... " 15 U.S.C.A. § 1312(c)(2) (West 1982) See also infra notes 145-46
(discussing Act).
Should the government attempt to obtain the discovery response by subpoena, Martindell might still
allow the trial court the discretion to refuse enforcement. See 594 F.2d at 296 n.6 (declining to decide
that issue).
142. Defendants and their employees will still desire protective orders, which are, after all,
costless to them and which may suppress their responses permanently if the case settles before trial.
143. Indeed, protective orders are generally suggested as a solution only when criminal proceed-
ings are pending at the time of civil discovery. E.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. Seib Mfg. Co., 481
F.2d 1204, 1215 (8th Cir. 1973); Note, Federal Courts-Discovery, 66 MICH L. REV. 738, 742-43
(1968).
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protective order to waive.
The primary point, however, is that the strategic advantages of invok-
ing for defendants and their employees-the ability to retard the plain-
tiff's discovery and to contain the disruptive impact of the plaintiff's ac-
tion-dictate against waiving even when concerns about criminal and civil
exposure and collateral consequences do not. Unless those advantages are
offset by affording plaintiffs some remedy when the privilege is invoked,
those able to invoke are not likely to waive.
Judges who recognize that granting a protective order will probably not
induce defendants and their employees to waive may still grant the order
for various reasons. They may feel the order does no harm and tends,
however slightly, to induce waiver in a few instances. More commonly,
they may use the protective order as a prelude to other remedies, and if
the deponents persist in invoking, only then impose the remedies recom-
mended here, such as barring the invokers from testifying and bringing
the invoking to the jury's attention. Their view, perhaps, is that the pro-
tective order bolsters the case for remedies by reducing further the chance
that the invoker's response would in fact be used to prosecute him.
But this approach overlooks the public interests undermined by any
protective order that suppresses information about crimes from the gov-
ernment. Judicial independence from the executive branch does not re-
quire courts in civil cases to remain indifferent about whether the govern-
ment learns of past crimes or gathers sufficient evidence to establish them.
On the contrary, the Supreme Court has recently emphasized that it is the
obligation of everyone to report crimes that come to his attention. ' The
hardship and oppression from civil discovery, which under the discovery
rules warrant a protective order, must not include the hardship resulting
from revealing past crimes or even past circumstances that incorrectly sug-
gest crimes.
Protective orders that may conceal information from the government
should especially be avoided in private antitrust cases. In passing the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976,'1" Congress
144. Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 557 (1980) ("Concealment of crime has been con-
demned throughout our history.") See also Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 243 n.5 (1980) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring) ("There is, of course, no reason why we [the Court] should encourage the citizen
to conceal criminal activity of which he has knowledge.")
145. Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (codified at scattered sections of 15, 18, and 28 U.S.C.
(1976)). Within four years of passing the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act Congress again sought to improve
antitrust enforcement through the Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
349, 94 Stat. 1154 (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). This Act responded to United
States v. GAF Corp., 596 F.2d 10, 15 (2d Cir. 1979), and confirmed the government's authority to
obtain from private plaintiffs the responses and information they had gathered through their civil
discovery. 15 U.S.C. § 1311 (1976). The Act expressly approved the Justice Department's use of the
fruits of a private plaintiff's discovery effort and reflected the conviction that the reasons for granting
protective orders pale in comparison to the interest in more effective and less wasteful antitrust en-
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reemphasized the national interest in bringing antitrust violations to the
government's attention. t4 ' The Act improved in several ways the Justice
Department's capacity to spot violations."4 7 Yet protective orders in private
antitrust cases pose precisely the danger that the violations revealed in
discovery but suppressed by the order will never be spotted by the govern-
ment or will be spotted too late for government action to be feasible.
Granting such a protective order, at least in the absence of any reason
other than the desires of the private parties, flies in the face of this con-
gressional action.
Even when the government is likely to spot the violation in time to
investigate, the trial court should refuse to approve a protective order di-
rected against the government. Granting the order invites the dilemma
faced by the court in Martindell v. ITT."8 There the government at-
tempted to obtain the discovery response provided to the private plaintiff
in the civil case. To reject its efforts would have been to interrupt, per-
haps to doom, proper law enforcement efforts. On the other hand, those
who provided the discovery response could claim they did so, rather than
invoke, in reliance on the protective order. It is no answer to this situation
to say, as the Second Circuit did,149 that the government may always ob-
tain this information itself by giving immunity. To give immunity to those
with the desired information is often to nullify any hope of prosecution.
Should the trial court respond that without the protective order no waiver
would have occurred and no information would have surfaced in the first
place, the reply must be that the better practice is to create remedies for
the plaintiff when the defendants or their employees invoke rather than to
grant a protective order, obtain a waiver, and then help the defendants
keep the door shut on the government.15 0
forcement. See H.R. REP. No. 870, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2716, 2723.
146. See generally S. REP. No. 803, 94th Cong, 2d Sess. pt. 1, at 1 (1976); Note, Government
Use of the Civil Investigative Demand to Obtain Materials Discovered in Private Antitrust Litigation,
79 COLUM. L. REV. 804, 807-10 (1979) (discussing legislative history).
147. The Act authorized the Department to serve a Civil Investigative Demand upon any natural
person or corporation that may have information pertaining to an antitrust violation, supplementing
an earlier Act that allowed a CID to be served only upon corporations under investigation. Compare
Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 102, 90 Stat. 1383, 1384 (1976) with Pub. L. No. 87-664, § 3(a), 76 Stat. 548,
548 (1962). The current statute is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1312(a) (1976). The Act also authorized
the service of CIDs to investigate activities that may result in antitrust violations; under the earlier
Act, CIDs could only be used to probe past or ongoing violations. Compare Pub. L. No. 94-435, §
101 (2), 90 Stat. 1383, 1383 (1976) with Pub. L. No. 87-664, § 2(c), 76 Stat. 548, 548 (1962). The
current statute is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1311(c) (1976). The Act further allowed use of CIDs to
demand interrogatories and depositions, not merely documents. Compare Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 102,
90 Stat. 1383, 1384 (1976) with Pub. L. No. 87-664, § 3(a), 76 Stat. 548, 548 (1962). The current
statute is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1312(a) (1976).
148. 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979).
149. Id. at 296.
150. Plainly, no due process concerns are raised if the government takes advantage of self-incrimi-
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3. Judicial Grants of Use Immunity
We have seen that granting the invoker a protective order does not so
displace the need for the privilege that a response can be compelled. If the
court does erroneously compel the invoker to respond, remedial principles
require that the invoker receive use immunity for his response.'' Thus,
an erroneous order to respond may provide the plaintiff his discovery and
the invoker his immunity.
This result suggests a possible solution for cases in which civil discovery
is blocked by the privilege. That solution calls for the judge to override the
privilege when it is invoked in the civil case and to compel a response.'52
In short, the judge is to grant the invoker use immunity just as the gov-
ernment might choose to do if it were the plaintiff. Although some invok-
ers will defy the compulsion order and subject themselves to contempt
proceedings, at least some should comply.'
The flaw in this solution is that the statutory power to grant immunity
is generally limited, for cogent policy reasons, to the executive branch. 5 4
Under these immunity statutes, the executive branch must request all use
natory information disclosed in civil discovery by one who could have invoked the privilege. The law
enforcement personnel responsible for the criminal prosecution have not coerced the information in
any way nor engaged in untoward practices. Nor has the plaintiff employed any improper or unfair
methods to obtain the incriminatory information, at least when that information is relevant to liability
in the civil case. Cf Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976) (information on tax return given
by one who could have invoked is admissible in criminal prosecution).
151. See Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 462 (1975) (dictum); c. United States v. Blue, 384
U.S. 251, 255 (1966) (evidence obtained by government in violation of privilege may not be used in
subsequent prosecution).
152. See Daly v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 132, 560 P. 2d 1193, 137 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1977);
Note, Resolving Tensions, supra note 134, at 678-87; Note, Constitutional Law, supra note 2, at 248.
If immunity is to be granted in a civil suit not involving the government, the court must act on its
own-the federal and state governments, not being parties, are not likely to be willing to intervene in
order to grant immunity. The cost and difficulty of investigating whether the invoker is a possible
target of future prosecutions are likely to deter such intervention.
153. For a discussion of the procedural options available to an invoker wishing to challenge a
compulsion order, see Minnesota State Bar Ass'n v. Divorce Assistance Ass'n, 311 Minn. 276, 248
N.W.2d 733 (1976).
154. See, e.g., United States v. D'Apice, 664 F.2d 75, 77-78 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
L'Hoste, 640 F.2d 693, 695 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Dunham Concrete Prods., 475 F.2d
1241, 1243-44 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 832 (1973); 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976).
Despite pronouncements that the government controls use immunity, courts have granted use im-
munity without formal orders from the government in several situations. At proceedings for accepting
pleas, for example, courts must grant defendants use immunity for their responses. FED. R. CRIM. P.
11(e)6. Courts have also given use immunity for statements made in presentence reports, sentencing
proceedings, and other proceedings. E.g., United States v. Inmon, 568 F.2d 326, 332-33 (3rd Cir.
1977) (use immunity accorded to testimony in pretrial double jeopardy hearing). And in Simmons v.
United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389-94 (1968), the Supreme Court held that the admission of testimony
given in a pretrial motion to suppress evidence was reversible error.
Some courts have given use immunity to compel witnesses to testify for the defense in criminal
trials. E.g., Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980). The court's authority to grant this
immunity is a matter of dispute. See, e.g., Note, The Sixth Amendment Right to Have Use Immunity
Granted to Defense Witnesses, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1266, 1268 (1978).
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immunity orders.' 5 The executive's control over use immunity follows
naturally from its control over the decision to prosecute. While in theory
granting use immunity leaves the government free to prosecute the invoker
as long as it does not use his immunized testimony, in practice later prose-
cution is virtually foreclosed because the government's burden of proving
it has not used the testimony is prohibitive.'56 The government's chance of
showing no use becomes even more remote when the judge in a private
civil case grants use immunity without notice to the government. Then the
government lacks even the opportunity to put under seal the evidence it
has already gathered, a step commonly taken when the government hopes
to show no use of forthcoming immunized testimony.'57
Since granting use immunity so jeopardizes a future prosecution, Con-
gress felt the discretionary judgment whether to exchange immunity for
testimony ought to be left exclusively to the executive branch, rather than
to the branch most insulated from popular control.'58 As the Seventh Cir-
cuit noted:
The decision whether to confer immunity . . . is the product of the
balancing of the public need for the particular testimony or docu-
mentary information in question against the social cost of granting
immunity and thereby precluding the possibility of criminally prose-
cuting an individual who has violated the criminal law. Therefore
the relative importance of particular testimony to federal law en-
forcement interests is a judgmental rather than a legal determination,
one remaining wholly within the competence of appropriate execu-
tive officials .... 159
155. The federal district court must issue the order. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003 (1976). But the
court's sole function is to ascertain whether the Justice Department has complied with the statute; it
does not review the merits of the Justice Department's decision. See In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215, 1219
(4th Cir. 1973); H.R. REP. NO. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 43, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4007, 4018; H.R. REP. NO. 1188, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1970).
Congressional committees are also authorized to grant use immunity to their witnesses provided
special procedures are followed. See 18 U.S.C. § 6005 (1976). These procedures are designed to
insure that the Justice Department is alerted to the immunity request and is able to assess the effect
of granting immunity on current and future prosecutions.
156. See Bauer, Reflections on the Role of Statutory Immunity in the Criminal Justice System,
67 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 143 (1976); Strachan, supra note 119, at 822; The Supreme Court,
1971 Term, 86 HARV L. REV. 50, 186-89 (1972); Note, The Unconstitutionality of Use Immunity:
Half a Loaf is Not Enough, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 202, 209 (1972).
Deciding whether the government has used the immunized testimony may require a post-trial hear-
ing if only because of the possibility that the prosecutors will use the testimony in cross-examining
defense witnesses or the invoker himself. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979) (use of immu-
nized testimony in cross-examination is forbidden).
157. See Attorney General's Guidelines Relating To Use of Statutory Provisions To Compel Tes-
timony or Production of Testimony § 7 (Jan. 14, 1977).
158. See H.R. REP. NO. 1549, supra note 155, at 43, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
4018; H.R. REP. No. 1188, supra note 155, at 13.
159. In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 478-79 (7th Cir. 1977).
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The judiciary also lacks the records needed for determining whether the
public interest calls for prosecuting the invoker. At the federal level, for
example, the Criminal Division of the Justice Department maintains ex-
tensive records and a search procedure for this very purpose. When future
prosecution may be warranted, but other interests support granting im-
munity, the executive can also better evaluate whether the option to prose-
cute can be kept open despite a grant of immunity by careful questioning
and other precautions.16
One might think that if a compulsion order is combined with a protec-
tive order, the government's burden of proving that it has not used the
response will be manageable. But this approach suffers from all the short-
comings of protective orders decribed earlier. Moreover, the government
will still face the burden of proving no use if the response or information
derived from the response spills out at trial and comes to its attention.
Furthermore, the plaintiff and any other persons privy to the response
will then possess the power virtually to veto later prosecution of the in-
voker by leaking the response to the government. For once the information
is released to the correct law enforcement officers, the government again
faces the prohibitive burden of showing no use. Providing such power to
private litigants, not all of whom are the invoker's adversaries even in the
civil case, invites abuse and extortion.
While the immunity solution opens up plaintiff's discovery, it does so at
the cost of foreclosing the government's opportunity for later prosecution.
Assuming trial courts may grant use immunity in private civil cases, they
should not so encroach on a domain traditionally reserved for prosecutors
without legislative direction to do so.
4. The Prospective Taint Fantasy
Courts wishing to compel invokers to respond but unwilling, for the
reasons given above, to grant them use immunity outright may claim that
a previous grant of use immunity by the government in another proceed-
ing will prevent the government from using the invoker's forthcoming re-
sponses against him.'6 ' The previous grant of use immunity may have
160. Plainly the court in the private civil case is not in a position to know whether the invoker
may have committed unrelated crimes or to alert those investigating unrelated crimes about the need
for precautions. Nor is the plaintiff in the civil case likely to be able or inclined to tailor his question-
ing so as to preserve the option to prosecute for unrelated crimes.
161. Compare In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Appeal of Fleischacker), 644 F.2d 70
(2d Cir. 1981) (compelling response based on previous grant of immunity) and Appeal of Starkey,
600 F.2d 1043 (8th Cir. 1979) (same) with In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (John W.
Culy), No. 80-1443 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 28, 1981) (refusing to compel response based on past grant of
immunity) and In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Appeal of Franey), 620 F.2d 1086 (5th
Cir. 1980) (same). The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in one such case. In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litig. (Appeal of Conboy), 655 F.2d 748 (7th Cir.) (compelling testimony), rev'd
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been given in a grand jury or legislative investigation, a criminal trial or a
government civil case. Because a use immunity order in one of these pro-
ceedings does not by its terms apply to testimony in a later proceeding,
such as a private civil case, 6 ' courts rationalize this approach by asserting
that when the plaintiff uses the invoker's prior immunized testimony as
the source of his questions, the responses will necessarily be derived from
that testimony. Therefore, the responses would be tainted with the immu-
nized testimony and could not be used in a prosecution of the invoker.
With the invoker safely protected against prosecutorial use of his re-
sponse, the response can be compelled. Because the court must decide that
all possible answers to the plaintiff's questions will be tainted with the
invoker's earlier testimony before it knows what those answers will be,
one might say the court is granting use immunity based on a prospective
taint.
The prospective taint approach will only assist a private plaintiff under
limited circumstances. The invokers must have been immunized previ-
ously and must then have testified about conduct sufficiently related to the
plaintiff's action to be discoverable. In addition, the invoker's immunized
testimony must have been revealed to the plaintiff. Hence, the approach
will be unavailable to plaintiffs not proceeding in the wake of a govern-
ment investigation or unable to see the immunized testimony because of
protective orders or concerns about grand jury secrecy.'63 Ironically, the
relatively few plaintiffs aided by the prospective taint approach need aid
the least, for they have at least seen the immunized testimony and may be
able to admit it in evidence despite the later assertions of privilege.'64
The impulse behind the protective taint approach is understandable.
The courts realize that the government's earlier decision to immunize the
invoker greatly reduces the chance that he will be prosecuted, even though
the possibility of prosecution remains. And the courts may believe that the
testimony in the civil case will merely repeat the earlier testimony.
on reh'g, 661 F.2d 1145 (1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 998 (1982).
162. Cf United States v. Kuehn, 562 F.2d 427, 430, 432 (7th Cir. 1977) (immunity does not
apply to later separate criminal proceedings); United States v. First W. State Bank, 491 F.2d 780,
786 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974).
163. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 (1979) (barring disclosure of
grand jury testimony to civil litigant); United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681-84
(1958) (same).
164. Plaintiffs who have seen the immunized testimony of one who invokes during discovery and
who does not testify at trial will face severe difficulties in getting the testimony admitted in their
action, especially if no cross-examination was possible. Nevertheless, in the federal courts they can
argue that the testimony given by a defendant or its employees constitutes party admissions under
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D). Or they can argue that the testimony falls within the "trustworthiness"
exception of FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5). See United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1353-55 (8th Cir.
1976) (holding immunized grand jury testimony within "trustworthiness exception"), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 914 (1977). Even if the testimony is not admissible, it may furnish the plaintiff with clues.
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But the approach suffers from at least two critical shortcomings: its ba-
sic premise is suspect, and it inevitably leads to a proliferation of immu-
nized testimony that encroaches upon the government's control of the
scope of immunity and its ability to prosecute. The approach posits that
the invoker's response to questions at the civil deposition must necessarily
be derived from and hence tainted with the responses he gave during his
immunized testimony whenever the questioner in the civil case has seen
the immunized testimony."6 5 But while the government will face difficulty
should it later attempt to prove the absence of taint in this situation, taint
is not assured. That the plaintiff-questioner has seen the immunized testi-
mony does not mean he has used the invoker's responses directly or indi-
rectly in conducting the civil deposition. Often the questions to be asked in
the deposition will be suggested rather obviously by the claims in the civil
case. For instance, the mere suspicion of price-fixing, which may have
arisen long before the immunized testimony occurred, will suggest a cata-
logue of questions to an antitrust litigator. The deposition questions may
also have arisen from evidence discovered independently in the civil case
or in the earlier criminal case. The plaintiff-questioner may have pre-
pared his questions before he saw the immunized testimony or, having
concluded that the immunized testimony provided no help, he may have
discarded it and prepared his questions independently. That the questions
in the civil case resemble or even duplicate the questions asked during the
immunized testimony does not by any means establish that the testimony
has been used. And surely the court should not accept uncritically the
plaintiff's self-serving representations that his questions will be derived
from the immunized testimony.
Even if the plaintiff uses, rather than merely duplicates, the questions
asked by the government during the immunized testimony, he will not
necessarily use the invoker's immunized responses. The government may
have prepared all the questions it asked during the immunized testimony
before hearing the responses. To use the government's questions is not to
use the invoker's responses unless those responses assisted the government
in framing its questions. And the immunity statutes only prevent use of
the invoker's immunized responses, not use of the government's questions.
The difficulty of assuming taint becomes most evident when one re-
members that the invoker's responses may differ from those given during
the immunized testimony. Assume that for six months the invoker had
165. More sweeping theories for assuring taint have already been rejected. For instance, in
United States v. Kuehn, 562 F.2d 427, 432 (7th Cir. 1977), the court refused to find that statements
to the press immediately following immunized testimony before a grand jury were derived from that
testimony. Taint could not be assumed simply because the news conference would not have occurred
absent the immunized testimony.
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been an excutive of a company that the plaintiff long suspected of price-
fixing. During the grand jury investigation the invoker received immunity,
and, when asked if he had discussed prices with the executive of his com-
pany's primary competitor, claimed lack of memory. Yet in the later pri-
vate civil case, the invoker, after being compelled to testify, may in re-
sponse to the same obvious question admit many incriminatory
discussions. In this commonplace example it is far from clear that the new
responses in the civil case would necessarily be derived from the earlier
immunized testimony. In general, the possibility of new responses under-
mines the assumption that all responses will be derived.
Another example of the same point arises when the invoker claims his
truthful testimony at the civil deposition may tend to incriminate him for
perjury committed during the previous immunized testimony. At least one
circuit court has found that invocations of privilege based on the fear of
incriminating one's self for perjury committed during prior testimony
must be sustained. 6' Nothing prevents a prosecution for the earlier per-
jury, and a truthful response to certain questions at the deposition in the
civil case may indeed provide either evidence or clues of that earlier per-
jury. The plaintiff seeking to compel the testimony will answer this claim
by asserting that the truthful testimony in the civil case cannot be used to
show perjury because it also is "derived" from the immunized testimony,
having been triggered by questions from a plaintiff who had seen the im-
munized testimony. This answer brings the key question underlying the
premise of the prospective taint approach into relief: is it sensible to as-
sume that forthcoming testimony will necessarily be derived from earlier,
possibly contradictory testimony just because the questioner has seen the
earlier testimony and is asking similar questions?'67
166. United States v. Housand, 550 F.2d 818 (2d Cir. 1977); see also United States v. Partin, 552
F.2d 621, 632 (5th Cir.) (by implication), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903 (1977).
167. The danger of new responses has been overlooked by some courts who believe that the harm
to the government can be avoided by limiting the questions plaintiff may ask at the deposition. Ac-
cordingly, one court limited a plaintiff to "questions which [were] within the same time, geographical
and substantive framework as the [immunized] grand jury testimony." Appeal of Starkey, 600 F.2d
1043, 1048 (8th Cir. 1979). Another, believing this standard not sufficiently "circumscribed," limited
plaintiff to questions that "concerned specific subjects that actually were touched upon by questions
. . . [asked during] the immunized testimony." In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (Appeal
of Fleischacker), 644 F.2d 70, 79 (2d Cir. 1981). Apparently these courts assumed-though their
basis for doing so is not explained-that if the questions at the deposition are sufficiently linked to
those asked earlier, all responsive answers will be so similar to earlier answers that they will necessa-
rily be tainted and will not increase the government's burden of showing the absence of taint.
Even if the proliferation of immunized testimony could be prevented by overseeing the questions the
plaintiff may ask, devising and applying proper standards for permissible questions creates a signifi-
cant burden for the court. As soon as the plaintiff departs from the script of the immunized testimony,
and he would gain little by adhering to that script throughout, the issue arises whether the question
and the possible responsive answers are sufficiently linked to the earlier immunized testimony. With
each question the court must consider not only whether the question and all responsive answers must
necessarily be tainted, but also whether the answers may increase the future prosecutor's burden of
1105
The Yale Law Journal
Even if the premise of the protective taint approach were sound, com-
pelling a response may prevent the government from prosecuting the in-
voker. When the plaintiff asks the court to overrule a privilege claim
based on prospective taint, he is not merely asking the court to decide the
taint issue. In effect, the plaintiff is asking the court to grant the invoker
use immunity for his compelled testimony." 8 Because the testimony will
never be identical to that given before, the compulsion order will increase
the amount of immunized testimony and broaden the scope of the previous
immunity. If the government learns of any newly compelled testimony or
information derived from that testimony, 6" it will find it even more diffi-
cult to show at a later prosecution that its evidence has not been derived
directly or indirectly from any immunized testimony. Indeed, the prolifer-
ation of immunized testimony tends to convert use immunity into transac-
tional immunity.
The intrusion on the authority of the executive branch is not merely
theoretical. Assume that the government, after giving use immunity, cut
short its questioning in order to limit the immunized testimony and main-
tain its option to prosecute. The court's later decision to compel the in-
voker to testify may foreclose that option if the invoker seizes the opportu-
nity to fill the record with highly incriminating responses. Once the
government learns of those responses or information derived from them, it
may no longer be able to show lack of taint. Whatever the harm done, the
judge's decision to compel testimony destroys the government's control of
the scope of immunity.
Yet, the government, which may be the only. party adversely affected
by compelling the testimony, is not before the court. Nor do any of the
parties before the court share the government's interest in restricting the
scope of immunity in order to maintain the option to prosecute. The
plaintiff surely cannot be relied upon to point out the possible absence of
taint, since he wants the response compelled. On the contrary, the plaintiff
can be expected to affirm that all his questions are derived from immu-
nized testimony. The invoker, at least on some occasions, will also desire
showing that his other evidence has not been tainted. The disputes invited by this approach threaten
to require the court's presence at the depositions.
168. Cf. Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 181 (1954) ("[A] witness does not need any statute to
protect him from the use of self-incriminating testimony he is compelled to give over his objection.");
In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig. (Appeal of Brown), 609 F.2d 867, 872 n.11 (7th Cir. 1979)
(citing Adams).
169. Compelled testimony given in the private civil suit and information derived from it may
reach the government through several channels: the attorneys, parties, and witnesses in the private
case, the press, or the rumor mill. Even a protective order will not prevent the information from
spilling out at a civil trial and then reaching the government indirectly. The tainted information may
reach the government even when government officials, in an attempt to maintain their option to prose-
cute, strive to remain uninformed.
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the immunity he may receive when his testimony is compelled. While the
defendant will often want the invokings upheld, it will not necessarily be
a party to the plaintiff's motion to overrule these invocations. Nor is it
likely to share the government's concern about foreclosing future prosecu-
tion. Admittedly, some courts employing the prospective taint approach
may know that the current government officials, as a practical matter, are
not interested in any further prosecution of the invokers. Nevertheless, the
failure of the approach to involve the government, despite the possible
adverse effect on the government, constitutes a serious flaw. The need for
government involvement requires that any decision about taint be reserved
until the government attempts to introduce allegedly tainted evidence in a
prosecution. Then the court is able to determine the taint issue with the
benefit of the government's views and the benefit of knowing what the
questions and responses turned out to be.'7°
B. Remedies to Allow
A combination of remedies, to be imposed consistently whenever defen-
dants or their employees invoke in civil cases, offers a better judicial re-
sponse than either the remedies just discussed or an attempt to devise rem-
edies case by case."' An outline of the proposed combination of remedies,
shorn of qualifications and exceptions, follows.
First, any invokings by defendants or their employees during the civil
case should be revealed to the factfinder at the civil trial. The factfinder
should learn the circumstances surrounding the invoking, such as the in-
quiries put to the invoker and the nature of the discovery requests in re-
sponse to which the invoking occurred. The plaintiff's attorney should be
allowed to inform the factfinder of the use of the privilege and the sur-
rounding circumstances without having to call the invoker to the stand.
The plaintiff also should be entitled to an instruction clarifying that the
jury may consider the use of the privilege insofar as it tends to establish
the facts in issue. Second, when use of the privilege by defendants or their
170. The Fifth Circuit cited the need for involvement by the government in rejecting the prospec-
tive taint approach. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 620 F.2d 1086, 1093 (5th Cir.
1980).
171. A few courts have opted to devise remedies case by case by applying a balancing test. E.g.,
Constanza v. Constanza, 66 N.J. 63, 328 A.2d 230 (1974); Mahne v. Mahne, 66 N.J. 53, 328 A.2d
225 (1974); see Note, The Self-Incrimination Privilege in Civil Discovery, 1970 WASH. U.L.Q. 371,
373. This test calls for consideration of such matters as whether the invoker is likely to be prosecuted
and whether the plaintiff is likely to find other evidence of equal value to that which the invokers
response would probably have provided. Such an approach fails to indicate before the invoking the
remedies that will follow, forces the court to speculate about future developments, and invites lengthy
disputes. Any uncertainty about the remedies for plaintiff after invokings by defendants and their
employees reduces the settlement value of the plaintiff's case and thereby encourages strategically
motivated invokings. The goal of encouraging defendants and their employees to invoke only when
they genuinely fear prosecution requires predictable remedies.
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employees contributes substantially to the plaintiff's failure of proof, the
court should place on the defendants the burden of showing that they have
not engaged in the conduct alleged by the plaintiff. Third, defendants and
their employees should be barred from later waiving the privilege and
testifying at trial unless they waive the privilege and submit to discovery a
sufficient time before trial to avoid prejudice to the plaintiff.
These remedies offer several benefits. They require no new legislation.
They allow the courts to adhere to current Fifth Amendment standards.
They stop short of granting a judgment against the defendant. If consist-
ently imposed, they will clarify the effects of invoking for all involved.
Taken together, they offer a chance of opening up discovery by inducing
defendants and their employees to invoke only when the danger of prose-
cution is genuine. Yet by maintaining without restriction the opportunity
to invoke, they protect those in genuine danger of prosecution from facing
the cruel trilemma of incrimination, perjury or contempt. While they tend
to offset the disadvantage imposed on plaintiffs, they do little or no vio-
lence to constitutional, procedural t72 or evidentiary principles.
1. Informing the Factfinder
Presently, many jurisdictions allow the factfinder to learn under some
circumstances that the defendant himself has invoked.1 3 For instance, a
plaintiff is often allowed to call the defendant to the witness stand, even
though he realizes that the defendant will invoke."" Some jurisdictions
also refuse to instruct the jury to disregard the use of privilege."' Some go
still further and allow the plaintiff to refer during argument to the defen-
dant's use of the privilege and to ask the factfinder to draw appropriate
inferences. 16 But even these disclosures of the defense's use of the privi-
lege at trial draw criticism.177 Moreover, it is not clear that the defendant's
use of the privilege during discovery can always be brought to the jury's
172. The remedies are fully consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in that no Rule
37 sanctions are imposed against the invoker or his employer.
173. The differences among jurisdictions are summarized in 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 31, §
2272, at 439 n.14.
174. E.g., In re Baun, 395 Mich. 28, 35-37, 232 N.W.2d 621, 624-25 (1975) (opposing party
may call party who has indicated he will invoke).
175. See, e.g., Bradley v. O'Hare, 2 A.D.2d 436, 442, 156 N.Y.S.2d 533, 540 (N.Y. App. Div.
1956); Crowley v. Crowley, 18 Misc. 2d 586, 589, 186 N.Y.S.2d 60, 63 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Grognet v.
Fox Valley Trucking Serv., 45 Wis. 2d 235, 239, 172 N.W.2d 812, 815 (1969).
176. See, e.g., Morris v. McClellan, 154 Ala. 639, 45 So. 641 (1908); Hinton & Sons v. Strahan,
266 Ala. 307, 96 So. 2d 426, 429 (1957) (citing Morris). But see In re Woll, 387 Mich. 154, 194
N.W.2d 835 (1972) (invoking may not be subject of comment).
177. Some courts have held that an invoking party in a civil case should suffer no adverse conse-
quences from his exercise of the privilege. See, e.g., Depew v. Hanover Ins. Co., 73 F.R.D. 101 (E.D.
Tenn. 1976) (jury should be instructed to disregard party's invoking); e. Shaneff v. Sabo, 251 Ind.
229, 240 N.E.2d 820 (1968) (error to force plaintiff to assert doctor-patient privilege before jury);
supra note 78 (discussing proposed FED. R. EVID. 513).
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attention, that such assertions of the privilege can be brought to the jury's
attention without the invoker being called as a witness, that an instruction
can be obtained allowing the jury to consider the assertions of the privi-
lege insofar as they constitute relevant evidence, or that the use of the
privilege by the defendant's employees can be used against the defendant
itself. 78
The objections to telling the jury about assertions of the privilege by the
defendants and their employees fall into two categories. There is first the
constitutional objection, that allowing the jury to learn of the defendant's
use of the privilege so burdens the defendant's privilege as to violate his
Fifth Amendment rights. The second objection is loosely termed the evi-
dentiary objection, that assertions of the privilege should not be brought
before the jury because they do not constitute relevant and admissible
evidence.' 79
a. The Constitutional Objections
The constitutional objections to drawing an inference against an invok-
ing defendant in a civil case draw support from several Supreme Court
decisions, and have led to sharp disagreements among the lower courts.180
In Griffin v. California, the Supreme Court forbid any comment on the
defendant's failure to testify in a criminal case. 8" Grunewald v. United
States'12 and Doyle v. Ohio'83 also forbid any reference at trial to a crimi-
178. See Moxham, A Comment Upon the Effect of the Exercise of One's Fifth Amendment Privi-
lege in Civil Litigation, 12 NEW ENG. L. REV. 265, 266 (1976) (inference can be drawn only when
party invokes and not when witness invokes).
Some states that refused to adopt proposed Rule 513, see supra note 78, forbidding any inference
from, or comment or jury instruction on a party's use of the privilege, and mandating that to the
extent possible juries be kept uninformed about invokings, nevertheless follow similar rules when a
witness, not a party, invokes. E.g., ME. R. EVID. 512, 513. These rules have the effect of treating an
employee of a corporate party, even a president or chief operating executive, as a neutral witness.
179. This objection ignores the claim that equitable considerations, namely the need to open up
discovery and redress the disadvantage imposed on the plaintiff by the defense's use of the privilege, in
themselves call for revealing the invokings. Such an equitable justification would ignore relevance and
admissibility. One hesitates to embrace such an equitable rule, however, since the invokers have not
violated any procedural principle and since the danger exists that the jury may consider the invokings
for improper and highly prejudicial purposes. Hence, we should examine to what extent admitting the
invokings can be justified on evidentiary grounds while keeping in mind that other reasons for admit-
ting them exist.
180. Compare Buzard v. Griffin, 89 Ariz. 42, 48, 358 P.2d 155, 158 (1960) (allowing inference)
with Frierson v. McIntyre, 151 F. Supp. 5, 6-7 (W.D. Va. 1953) (inference unconstitutional).
181. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). In Griffin the no-comment rule in criminal cases was found to be
required by the Fifth Amendment itself. A similar result was reached in Brooks v. Tennessee, 406
U.S. 605 (1972) (state statute requiring criminal defendant to testify before other defense witnesses or
not at all violates defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege). Griffin has recently come under attack.
See, e.g., Ayer, The Fifth Amendment and the Inference of Guilt from Silence: Griffin v. California
After Fifteen Years, 78 MICH. L. REV. 841 (1980).
182. 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
183. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
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nal defendant's use of the privilege before the grand jury or at the time of
arrest, even to impeach a criminal defendant who had testified to his
innocence.'"
More important, a long line of non-criminal cases forbids the states
from denying public employment, cancelling government contracts, or dis-
barring attorneys based on the use of the privilege. '85 Some of these cases
played a major role in obstructing government efforts to purge political
dissidents from public employment. 8 6 These cases emphasize that "no
cost" may be imposed on a use of the privilege.
But in Baxter v. Palmigiano,'87 the Burger Court put the constitutional
objection to rest. Palmigiano was a prisoner charged in a disciplinary
hearing with inciting a disruption of prison operations. Warned that his
testimony at the hearing might be used to prosecute him but that his fail-
ure to testify would be held against him by the Disciplinary Board, he
invoked the privilege and refused to testify. After hearing other evidence,
the Board ordered him placed in punitive segregation and reclassified
downward.
The Supreme Court assumed on appeal that the Board had drawn an
adverse inference from Palmigiano's invoking and upheld the Board's ac-
tion. Justice White strictly limited Griffin's ban on drawing inferences
from invokings to criminal proceedings. He indicated that the "no cost"
line of cases, none of which involved criminal proceedings, applied only
when the invoking resulted in automatic imposition of some sanction and
184. Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 415-24. In Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980), the Court
said the defendant's failure to report a killing for several days could be used to impeach a claim of
self-defense. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), was distinguished on the ground that there the
government, by warning the defendant of his right to remain silent, had in effect encouraged him to
remain silent; hence, holding his silence against him would offend due process. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at
239-40. That Doyle is said to rely on the due process clause rather than on the privilege against self-
incrimination is significant. It suggests that a defendant's use of the privilege at a grand jury or other
pre-trial proceeding may be used later to impeach his trial testimony, as long as the invoking was not
encouraged or induced by the prosecutor. Jenkins also reaffirmed Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S.
494, 497-98 (1926), which allowed the prosecution to impeach the defendant with his refusal to testify
at his earlier trial for the same offense. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 235.
Grunewald, which barred impeachment use of invokings occurring before the Grand Jury, had put
Raffel in doubt. Jenkins now puts Grunewald in doubt.
185. In each case, a statute or regulation established that some non-criminal sanction, such as loss
of government employment, would follow any invoking; in each, the invoking occurred during a pro-
ceeding brought by the state. E.g., Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973) (government contracts);
Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280 (1968) (employment with
sanitation department); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (attorney discipline proceeding).
186. E.g., Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956). In contrast, civil cases
between private parties are not vehicles for state investigations and harrassment of political dissidents.
Nor do they often concern the exercise of First Amendment rights. But see Independent Prods. Corp.
v. Loew's, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (antitrust plaintiffs, producers of blacklisted film,
hampered by a claim of privilege that may have been required to deflect inquiries into their political
beliefs and associations).
187. 425 U.S. 3089 (1976).
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when no other evidence of the conduct at issue had been received.
If a prison disciplinary hearing is not sufficiently akin to a criminal
prosecution for Griffin's no-comment rule to apply, Griffin plainly cannot
govern a private civil case. The penalties imposed at the prison hearing
included increased confinement and loss of liberty, higher stakes than
those in a civil case. The opposing party was the state, with its power to
offer use immunity if it wanted Palmigiano's information. Citing Wig-
more, Justice White took as settled that "the Amendment 'does not pre-
clude the inference where the privilege is claimed by a party to a civil
cause.' ,s8
As narrowed by Baxter, the "no-cost" line of cases would require only
that the invokings of civil defendants and their employees not form the
sole ground for plaintiff's recovery. Moreover, the "no-cost" cases may be
distinguished altogether from private civil cases because, in each of the
former cases, it was a government entity that was imposing sanctions for
invoking. Such conduct raises the fear, absent in the private suit, of gov-
ernmental attempts to coerce incriminating disclosures, thereby circum-
venting the limits on discovery in criminal cases.
Justice Brennan's Baxter dissent, in which Justice Marshall joined,
sharply criticized the majority's narrow reading of the "no-cost" cases.
The dissenters read those cases to forbid the government from imposing
any substantial sanction on a person who chooses to invoke the privilege
rather than answer questions posed by the government. The two Justices
plainly were concerned with governmental coercion of disclosures through
threats of non-criminal sanctions: left unchecked, the government might
use such sanctions to circumvent the normal limits on criminal discovery.
Significantly, however, even the dissenters would have allowed an adverse
inference to be drawn from an invoking in a private civil suit, where pro-
phylactic "foxhunter" policies designed to keep the government from
abusing its powers do not operate:
In a civil suit involving only private parties, no party brings to the
battle the awesome powers of the government, and therefore to per-
mit an adverse inference to be drawn from exercise of the privilege
does not implicate the policy considerations underlying the privilege.
But where the government "deliberately seeks" the answers to in-
criminatory questions, allowing it to benefit from the exercise of the
privilege aids, indeed encourages, governmental circumvention of our
adversary system.' 9
188. Id. at 318 (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 31, at 439 (emphasis in Baxter)).
189. 425 U.S. at 335.
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Hence, the "no-cost" cases, even as read by Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall, do not bar drawing an adverse inference against the invoker in a
private civil case. The lack of concern about government overreaching in
private civil cases combines with the enhanced concern about fair treat-
ment for the plaintiff, who, unlike the government, is relatively powerless
to overcome the disadvantage imposed by the defense use of the privilege.
Baxter not only settled the issue of whether adverse inferences could be
drawn in a non-criminal proceeding but the converse of that issue as well.
The converse issue is whether a potential invoker who waives the privi-
lege and responds in order to avoid non-criminal sanctions may later pre-
vent use of his response in a criminal case against him on the ground that
his response was "compelled" in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights.
Palmigiano, for instance, could have raised this issue by responding in the
disciplinary hearing and then moving to prevent any use of his testimony
during his subsequent prosecution. The grounds for his suppression mo-
tion would have been that the non-criminal sanctions for invoking, namely
the drawing of an adverse inference in the disciplinary proceeding, com-
pelled his response. Indeed, many cases have presented this scenario, and
guidelines have been developed for determining which non-criminal sanc-
tions are so severe that they compel the waiver of the privilege."' But
constitutionally permissible sanctions for invoking will not, by definition,
compel a waiver. Thus, Baxter necessarily implies that Palmigiano's testi-
mony at the disciplinary hearing, should he have decided to respond,
would not have been compelled and could have been used against him in a
later prosecution.191 Similarly, no testimony given in a civil case by a per-
son who could have invoked will be considered compelled, even though the
invoking would have led to an adverse inference in the civil case.
Other cases also indicate that the "sanction" of allowing an adverse
inference to follow from an invoking does not render the response "com-
pelled." In McGautha v. California,t" the guilt and sentence of a defen-
dant charged with murder were determined in a unitary trial; as a result
of invoking the privilege by declining to testify during the trial the defen-
dant also lost his opportunity to testify for a lenient sentence. Upholding
the unitary trial despite this sanction, Justice Harlan asserted that testi-
mony will not be considered "compelled" merely because negative conse-
quences may attend an invoking:
190. See, e.g., Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S.
377 (1968); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
191. Since Baxter, lower courts have ruled that statements uttered during probation revocation
hearings are not "compelled." E.g., Ryan v. Montana, 580 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1978).
192. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
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The criminal process, like the rest of the legal system, is replete
with situations requiring "the making of difficult judgments" as to
which course to follow. Although a defendant may have a right, even
of constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses,
the Constitution does not by that token always forbid requiring him
to choose. The threshold question is whether compelling the election
impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights
involved.19
Specifically, Harlan found that allowing adverse evidentiary consequences
to follow from an invoking would not render the response compelled: "It
is not contended, nor could it be successfully, that the mere force of evi-
dence is compulsion of the sort forbidden by the [Fifth Amendment]
privilege."' 94
Since the 1976 Baxter decision the Court has continued to allow ad-
verse inferences to be drawn from the use of the privilege in civil cases.
Although in Lefkowitz v. Cunningham,9 ' the Court struck down a New
York statute requiring an officer of a political party to waive the privilege
under certain circumstances, it carefully adhered to the narrow reading of
the "no-cost" cases. Under that statute, invoking the privilege triggered
immediate dismissal from party office and a five-year ban on holding any
other party or public position. Thus, the case presented the kind of sanc-
tion forbidden by the "no cost" cases, a sanction automatically imposed
solely for invoking the privilege in response to an inquiry from the gov-
ernment. The Court distinguished Baxter in a footnote: "Baxter did no
more than permit an inference to be drawn in a civil case from a party's
refusal to testify. Respondent's silence in Baxter was only one of a num-
ber of factors to be considered by the finder of fact in assessing a penalty
"M96
Hence, the majority and dissenting opinions in Baxter establish that an
invoking in a civil case may constitutionally lead to an adverse inference
against the invoker and may be the subject of comment by opposing coun-
sel. As long as the invoking and any attendant inference do not constitute
the sole basis for the judgment against the invoker, no constitutional objec-
tion is warranted. Whether the Constitution would permit the granting of
a default judgment against a defendant for his invoking in a civil case,
however, is less clear.
More generally, Harlan's suggestion in McGautha that the constitu-
tional issue raised by any remedy given the plaintiff must turn on the
193. Id. at 213.
194. Id.
195. 431 U.S. 801 (1977).
196. Id. at 808 n.5.
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extent to which the remedy impairs any of the policies behind the privi-
lege throws attention back to the policy analysis in Part III. There we
saw that the "fox hunter" policies behind the privilege are not seriously
implicated in civil cases between private parties. The policies that are im-
plicated in these cases, such as the policies against the cruel trilemma, will
not be offended by remedies that only tend to increase the invoker's civil
exposure.
b. The Evidentiary Objections
The evidentiary objections to bringing invokings to the attention of the
factfinder assume that the factfinder should determine the issues in a civil
case only upon admissible evidence and the legal instructions of the court.
Invokings, especially out-of-court invokings, must therefore carry eviden-
tiary significance in themselves to come before the factfinder. This part of
the article, accordingly, evaluates the evidentiary objections, notes the pro-
cedural benefits of treating past invokings as admissible evidentiary events,
and then posits a theory for admitting invokings under conventional evi-
dence principles.
i. The Need for an Evidentiary Status
A jury often learns about invokings without the court deciding whether
the invokings are admissible evidence. When a defendant invokes while
testifying as an adverse witness, for example, the jury will see the invok-
ing. Defense counsel, feeling that enough damage has already been done,
may choose not to force the court to decide whether the invokings ought to
be admissible. But the defendant can argue that, unless the court accepts
the invokings as admissible evidence, it should instruct the jury to disre-
gard them, and that the court should grant defense counsel's request
before trial to prevent the plaintiff from calling to the stand a defendant
who is certain to invoke.19 7 Finally, ethical standards may restrict efforts
to bring to the jury's attention any assertion of a privilege that is not itself
admissible evidence. 98
Even if the court allows a plaintiff at trial to call a defendant or his
employee who has invoked and has indicated that he will invoke again,
the privilege still provides a potent weapon for the defense unless out-of-
197. This was, of course, the treatment mandated by Proposed Rule 513 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. See supra note 78.
198. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION
7.6(c) provides that an attorney should not attempt to alert the jury to a person's use of the privilege.
Ethical Consideration 7-25 also provides that a lawyer should not put before a jury matters that it
cannot properly consider. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF
ETHICAL STANDARDS 83.
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court invokings are themselves admissible evidentiary events. For example,
a defendant's employee who has invoked during a deposition may use the
privilege to deflect discovery while he is available to the plaintiff, but then
may avoid the need to invoke before the jury by making himself unavaila-
ble at the time of trial. Unless his out-of-court invokings are admissible in
their own right, the jury may never learn of them. Moreover, a plaintiff
required to call the invoking defendant and employees to testify at trial in
order to bring out their invokings will be forced to run undue strategic
risks. When called, the witnesses may waive the privilege and proceed to
give harmful testimony. Even if the court strikes this testimony on the
ground of unfair surprise, the jury might feel that the plaintiff is ob-
structing the case by refusing to let the witnesses testify. Once the wit-
nesses are off the stand, it is not clear that the plaintiff can inform the
jury of the witnesses' earlier invokings. Furthermore, even if the "testi-
mony" goes as planned, with the witnesses invoking as they did at their
deposition, the jury may feel that the plaintiff's counsel unnecessarily em-
barrassed the witnesses, especially if the jury learns that he knew in ad-
vance that the witnesses would invoke. Indeed, calling witnesses to the
stand so that the jury may see them invoke is a contrived and unseemly
procedure, which would become unnecessary if the out-of-court invokings
themselves were admissible.
Courts have suggested several evidentiary theories for admitting a de-
fendant's out-of-court invokings. When a defendant who has previously
invoked takes the stand and provides testimony that does not seem to in-
criminate him, courts have admitted his previous invokings as prior incon-
sistent statements.199 But in order to qualify as prior inconsistent state-
ments, the earlier invokings must be found sufficiently inconsistent with
the defendant's in-court testimony. Because even the innocent may prop-
erly invoke, and because the invoker's reason for believing his response
incriminating probably never was explored, establishing an inconsistency
might prove difficult. Moreover, this approach still allows defendants and
their employees who invoke to block the plaintiff's discovery and to con-
ceal their version of events until trial. Hence, the prior inconsistent state-
ment approach, which applies only when the invoker takes the stand, does
not resolve the plaintiff's dilemma. 00
Another evidentiary theory for admitting prior invokings would treat
199. The prior inconsistent statement rationale has been employed even against the defendant in
criminal cases. In Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926), which was reaffirmed in Jenkins v.
Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 235 (1980), a criminal defendant was impeached for his failure to testify at a
previous criminal trial.
200. If, as this Article recommends, a defendant or employee who has invoked throughout civil
discovery is barred from testifying at trial, the prior inconsistent statement rationale need not be
considered.
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them as silence in the face of an incriminatory accusation. Silence under
such circumstances has been considered an admission that the accusation
is correct. The theory is that the natural reaction of an innocent man to
an untrue accusation is a prompt denial; silence, therefore, shows con-
sciousness of guilt. As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
declared:
Instant impulse, spontaneous anxiety and deep yearning to repel
charges thus impugning his honor would be expected from an inno-
cent man . . . . In the face of such accusations, men commonly do
not remain mute but voice their denial with earnestness, if they can
do so with honesty. Culpability alone seals their lips.2" '
Thus, the accusations, the surrounding circumstances, and the defendant's
silence in response have been held admissible. 0 2 This principle has even
been extended to admit all statements made in the party's presence, unless
the party can show that he lacked either the opportunity or the motive to
deny their accuracy.2 °0
But the invokings-as-silence theory is inadequate. First, invokings will
not necessarily occur in response to an assertion or to a question contain-
ing an assertion. 2 4 More often, invokings follow open-ended questions
that are free of assertions, such as questions that ask a deponent what he
did on a particular night. Invoking in response to such a question, while
appropriate under current standards, hardly shows assent to any assertion.
It illustrates only the invoker's belief that a complete answer might at
least provide a due that would lead to incriminating evidence. Second, the
invokings-as-silence theory assumes that the natural response of the inno-
cent to an incriminatory accusation will be a spontaneous and emphatic
denial. But this assumption is suspect in the atmosphere of most deposi-
tions, where the deponent strives to stay calm and to produce a helpful
record through cautious wording of all replies. In this setting the innocent
should hardly be expected to respond with the righteous outrage described
by the Massachusetts court.
ii. Invokings as Statements of a Party
We have seen the shortcomings of the current evidentiary theories for
admitting past invokings. Granted, a statement claiming a privilege rather
201. Attorney Gen. v. Pelletier, 240 Mass. 264, 316, 134 N.E. 407, 423 (1922).
202. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 48, § 270 (b).
203. Id.
204. An example of a question containing an assertion would be: "Mr. Defendant, you and your
gang assaulted the plaintiff because he was black, didn't you?" Under the invoking-as-silence ap-
proach, invoking in response to such a question tends to admit the assertion.
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than attempting to respond to an inquiry does not fit squarely into any
evidentiary category.2 °5 Nevertheless, some distinctions are possible. A re-
fusal to respond on the ground of attorney-client, doctor-patient, or
spousal immunity does not say or imply anything about the content of the
withheld response. It suggests only that the response would betray infor-
mation that was revealed under certain circumstances by the client, pa-
tient or spouse. In contrast, a refusal to respond on the ground that one's
answer might tend to incriminate one does say something about the con-
tent of the response that, depending on the question and the surrounding
circumstances, may tend to prove relevant facts in the civil case.
Accordingly, such a statement by a party may, with modest stretching
of evidentiary principles, merit the same treatment as most statements of a
party: the party's invoking would be considered an assertion of his belief
that his response might tend to incriminate him. Hearsay issues would not
arise from the lack of cross-examination because statements of a party are
excluded from the definition of hearsay, at least under the Federal Rules
of Evidence and the law of most states.2 6
The theories for admitting statements of a party when offered by an
adverse party seem to rely more on common sense than on a discrete or
sophisticated rationale. Upon examination, however, the theories apply as
well to the statement that one's response may incriminate him as to other
statements of a party. One theory holds, for example, that the rule permit-
ting the admission of statements of a party-opponent stems from the
premises of the adversary theory of litigation: a party should not be al-
lowed to claim that his own prior declarations are too untrustworthy to be
admitted.2 7 Professors Louisell and Mueller have expressed the theory as
follows:
Given that a party bears the lion's share of responsibility for making
or breaking his own case, it is reasonable to conclude that he is in no
position to claim that his own statement should be excluded because
not ... subject to cross-examination, under circumstances enabling
the trier of the fact to observe demeanor. . . . Again the philosophy
of the adversary system implies the judgment that it is fair to put a
party at risk that the trier will accord full evidential force to his own
statement unless he comes forward with some kind of counterproof
205. The statements required to invoke a privilege have not been treated as admissible evidence in
themselves. When the marital communications privilege, attorney-client privilege, or physician-patient
privilege is invoked, neither an adverse inference nor a comment is allowed. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 31, §§ 2243, 2322, 2386.
206. FED. R. EVID. 801 (d)(2)(A) provides that "[a] statement is not hearsay" if it is "offered
against a party and is. . . his own statement, in either his individual or a representative capacity. ..
." The evidence codes of several states are identical. E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-801(4)(b)(i) (1979).
207. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 48, § 262.
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208
Wigmore has added that a party's statements also are admissible under
the same logic that admits prior inconsistent statements. They are incon-
sistent not with the party's testimony, for he may have not testified, but
with his pleadings-or with the very fact of his opposition to the opposing
party's claims. The inconsistency is equally discrediting and admissible on
that basis. According to Wigmore, the inconsistency between the statement
and the party's position need not be apparent; it will be presumed from
the fact that the opposing party is the one offering the statement." 9 Again,
the rationale applies as much to the invoking statements that one's re-
sponse would tend to incriminate him as to any other statements of a
party.
Taking a different approach, Professor Strahorn has contended that
out-of-court statements of a party should be admissible because they pro-
vide relevant circumstantial evidence of the party's conduct. Such state-
ments may furnish a basis for an inference as to the the party's state of
mind, in turn allowing an inference as to the facts that produced that state
of mind. This theory also warrants admitting invokings as much as any
other statements. The invoking creates an inference that the invoker be-
lieved his response would incriminate him, and that in turn may create an
inference about his conduct. 10
When offered against the invoking party, his out-of-court statement
that his response would tend to incriminate him is at least as reliable as
most statements of a party. The invoking statement is uttered in the
course of a formal proceeding, after the party and his counsel have had an
opportunity to consider their response. It is a sufficiently grave admission
that parties who resort to it are likely to have reviewed and reflected on
their past actions beforehand. 211
Treating a defendant's invoking as a statement of a party assists the
plaintiff substantially. First, the statement would be admissible for all
purposes, including showing that a complete response would tend to in-
criminate the invoker. Second, the out-of-court invoking could be intro-
duced as evidence without the plaintiff having to call the invoking defen-
dant to the stand; thus, the plaintiff would control whether and when the
208. 4 D. LOUISELL & 0. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 250-51 (1980).
209. 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1048 (J. Chadborne rev. ed. 1972).
210. See generally Strahorn, A Reconsideration of the Hearsay Rule and Admissions, 85 U. PA.
L. REV. 484, 491-93 (1937) (discussing utterances as circumstantial evidence).
211. Granted, when most out-of-court statements of a party are admitted, the party will be able to
testify and attempt to explain his statement at trial. This will not be the case if, as recommended here,
the party's invoking bars him from testifying. But the party's capacity to testify is not a prerequisite
for admitting his earlier statement. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 48, § 263.
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invokings are disclosed. Third, the invokings would be admissible despite
being in the form of an opinion. Fourth, the plaintiff would not need to
show that the invoking was against the defendant's interest. 2
Moreover, treating a defendant's invoking as a statement of a party
allows the plaintiff to introduce the defendant's past invokings regardless
of where they occurred-in the defendant's answer, in his reply to the
plaintiff's interrogatories or requests for admissions or documents, or at
his deposition. The invoking would be admissible even though the defen-
dant later changed his mind, waived the privilege, and submitted to dis-
covery. Finally, past invokings would be admissible even when the privi-
lege is no longer available due to the running of the statute of limitations
or the attachment of jeopardy.213
iii. Employee Invokings as Vicarious Statements of a Party
When the defendant is a corporation, the privilege is used most fre-
quently by the corporation's employees at depositions. The corporate de-
fendant's strategy may call for its employees to invoke at every opportu-
nity. Again, the appropriate remedy is to enable the plaintiff to bring
these invokings to the jury's attention and to argue whatever inferences
against the defendant corporation they provide.
An invoking by an employee during a deposition should be treated as a
vicarious statement of the defendant corporate employer if the invoker was
still working for the defendant corporation at the time of the invoking and
if the question that triggered the invoking related to the employee's
work.21 1 If invokings are treated as vicarious statements of the corporate
212. Of course, the party remains free to show by other evidence that his response would not have
incriminated him.
213. An alternative theory for admitting a party's out-of-court invoking would treat the invoking
as an admission by conduct. The closest analogy is to a party's refusal to submit upon request to a
physical examination. When the discovery rules allowed a party to refuse a physical examination, the
opposing party was entitled to inform the factfinder of his opponent's refusal and to argue appropriate
inferences. See Texas & N.O. Ry. v. Rooks, 292 S.W. 536 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927); 8 J. WIG-
MORE, supra note 31, § 2220, at 195.
When physical examinations became compulsory, see C. McCORMICK, supra note 48, at 656 n.25,
the need for an adverse inference against the party refusing the examination vanished since that party
could be subjected to sanctions under FED. R. CIV. P. 37. If an opposing party never attempted to
compel his opponent to submit to a physical examination, no inference against the opponent would
exist. Thus, as the discoverability of the information that the opposing party seeks to suppress in-
creases, the reason and need for admitting the efforts to suppress decrease. In contrast, the privileged
material that the invoker has suppressed is not discoverable, and hence the reason and need to admit
the invoking is substantial.
214. See Ralph Hegman Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 293 Minn. 323, 198 N.W.2d 555 (1972).
The same treatment should be accorded invokings of the employee whether they occur in response to
interrogatories, other discovery requests, or questions at trial.
That the invoker is no longer the defendant's employee at the time of his invokings need not neces-
sarily bar admitting the invokings as a vicarious admission. The fact of present employment serves
primarily to reduce the chance that the employee will falsely claim to have engaged in criminal con-
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party-opponent, they will be exempt from the hearsay rule as long as they
relate to a matter within the scope of the invoking employee's employ-
ment.2 15 If the employee is authorized to perform certain acts, his state-
ments about those acts will be treated as statements of the employer."1 6
The policies for admitting the statement of an employee against his em-
ployer, despite his the employer's inability to cross-examine the employee
at the time of the statement, apply as much to an invoking at the em-
ployee's deposition as to other vicarious statements. At least four factors
support the reliability of employee statements.2 7 First, employees are not
likely to jeopardize their jobs by making false statements that discredit
their corporate employers. If the other remedies suggested here are im-
posed, an employee at a deposition would have every incentive to excul-
pate his corporate employer if he could. Corporate counsel would have
ample opportunity to explain the corporation's interest to the deponent-
employee. The chance is remote that an employee would invoke in order
to suggest that his corporation is guilty of criminal conduct when it is not.
And as long as the deposition questions concern the employee's activities
in his work for the defendant corporation, the chance is also remote that
the employee would invoke because his response would incriminate him
personally even though the corporate employer is innocent.218
Second, the reliability of vicarious statements is supported by the
probability that the speaker will be well informed when the subject con-
cerns matters within the scope of his employment. Invokings would share
this reliability as long as the questions in reply to which the invokings
occur concern the employee-deponent's work.
Third, the employer against whom a vicarious statement is offered will
duct for which the defendant employer is liable. Any factors suggesting that a former employee retains
some loyalty to his former employer-such as the fact that the employer is paying for his attor-
ney-would serve the same purpose.
215. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D) ("A statement is not hearsay if. .. [it] is offered against a
party and is . . . a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his
agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship ... ") This section eliminated
the need to show that the employee had "speaking authority."
216. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 78, § 801(d)(2)(D)[01], at 801-158 to -162.
217. See, e.g., 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 208, at 318-22 (discussing factors
supporting admission of vicarious statements).
218. Corporations and partnerships are often prosecuted for the criminal activities of employees
acting within the scope of their employment. See, e.g., United States v. A&P Trucking Co., 358 U.S.
121 (1958); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 125 (5th Cir. 1962); Continental Bak-
ing Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137, 149 (6th Cir. 1960). Some courts have found that an adverse
inference may be drawn against a corporation from invokings by its employees or agents. E.H. Boerth
Co. v. LAD Properties, 82 F.R.D. 635, 644-45 (D. Minn. 1979); Ralph Hegman Co.. v. Transamer-
ica Ins. Co., 293 Minn. 323, 198 N.W.2d 555 (1972).
The assumption in the text is that the plaintiff is suing the defendant corporation based in part on
the work-related actions of the invoking employee. Of course, if the corporation or its stockholders are
suing the employee for actions harming the corporation, no inference against the corporation would
arise.
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generally have access to evidence that explains or rebuts the matter as-
serted, if any such explanation or rebuttal is possible.2 9 This holds true
when the employee-deponent invokes, for the defendant corporation may
call fellow employees or produce internal documents to explain why the
employee's invoking does not establish its criminal or civil liability.
Finally, a deponent-employee's assertion that his response will incrimi-
nate him carries an added element of reliability because it is ordinarily
made under oath. Other types of vicarious statements that are admissible
under the Federal Rules of Evidence and their state equivalents fre-
quently are not.
220
The plaintiff will benefit substantially from being able to treat the em-
ployee's invoking as a vicarious statement of the employer. He will be
able to offer the statement into evidence for any purpose, even though it is
in the form of a conclusion.22' He will be able to read the statement and
the accompanying questions to the jury whenever he wishes. And he will
not need to call the invoker to the stand or to explain his absence.222
Treating the invoking statements of employees as vicarious statements
of the corporation itself might seem unfair to the corporate defendant. Af-
ter all, if corporate counsel had attempted to cross-examine the employees
at their depositions, the employees might have invoked the privilege just as
they did in response to the plaintiff's questions. Yet treating employees'
statements about their fear of self-incrimination as vicarious statements
means that they will come before the jury despite the absence of cross
examination. Moreover, one reason for admitting vicarious statements is
that the defendant-employer may usually call the employee to the stand to
explain his earlier statements. But this will not be the case if as recom-
mended here the invoking employees are barred from testifying. Hence it
will be more difficult for the defendant corporation to develop evidence to
explain the employees' earlier invokings. Especially since many invokings
prove so little and prejudice so much, the defense might argue, admitting
them unduly increases the corporation's civil exposure and allows invok-
219. 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 208, at 320.
220. Courts have admitted depositions of employees as vicarious admissions under FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2)(D) on several occasions. See, e.g., Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Illinois Cent. Gulf
R.R., 615 F.2d 470, 476 (8th Cir. 1980); Rule v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Orna-
mental Ironworkers, Local Union No. 396, 568 F.2d 558, 569 n.17 (8th Cir. 1977). Of course, such
depositions are usually admissible on other grounds. If the employee testifies, parts of his deposition
may be admissible as prior inconsistent statements. FED. R. EVID. 801 (d)(1)(A). If the employee was
subject to cross-examination at the deposition and is unavailable at trial, his deposition is admissible
under FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
221. See Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival & Research Center, 588 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1978)
(admitting against corporation opinion of corporate agent about cause of plaintiff's injuries even
though agent lacked personal knowledge of underlying facts). C. MCCORMICK, supra note 48, at 632-
33 (conclusory opinions of agents are admissible).
222. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 48, at 629-30.
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ing employees to manufacture "evidence" against the corporation at no
legal risk to themselves.
A few practical considerations put this supposed inequity into perspec-
tive. First, corporate counsel will be able to hear the employee's story at
one time or another. The corporate employee has a duty, unmitigated by
any privilege, to reveal his information to the corporate agent appointed to
reply to interrogatories and requests for admissions addressed to the cor-
poration.223 Second, the corporate defendant will often be able to influence
an employee's decision about whether to invoke. This influence may re-
duce the already low risk that employees will invoke solely to suggest the
guilt of an innocent corporate employer. Third, a corporate defendant is
commonly held responsible for the behavior of its employees during litiga-
tion. For example, the opposing party is normally allowed to urge the
jury to draw an adverse inference against the corporate defendant whose
employee has fled the jurisdiction before trial; that corporate counsel tried
to prevent the flight is immaterial.224 Furthermore, courts have not hesi-
tated to take measures against a corporate plaintiff whose employee in-
vokes; these measures have included dismissal of the corporation's
complaint.2 5
Corporate defendants might argue that admitting their employee's in-
vokings against them will not improve discovery because the employees
will invoke in any event, in order to reduce his own criminal exposure.
But this argument misses the point. Unless an employee's invoking is ad-
missible in the civil case against the employer-defendant, the defendant
will possess a strong incentive to pressure its employee to invoke in order
to stymie the plaintiff. Admitting the employee's invoking at least reduces
that incentive and thus should tend to open up discovery. Even if discov-
ery is not improved, admitting employee invokings will reduce the strate-
gic advantage those invokings give the defense.
223. See supra p. 1069.
224. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2) illustrates the extent to which a corporate party is exposed to
sanctions when its officers, directors, or managing agents fail to comply with discovery orders. The
sanctions extend to rendering a default judgment against the corporation. Id. See also Diaz v. South-
ern Drilling Corp., 427 F.2d 1118 (5th Cir. 1970) (affirming default judgment against corporate
defendant because corporate officer willfully failed to appear for deposition). Invokings of corporate
employees during litigation in which the corporation is a party are just as attributable to the
corporation.
Remedies should not be denied merely because the corporate party shows that its attorneys or
executives exercised all reasonable efforts to discourage the invoking. But see Independent Prods.
Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 30 F.R.D. 377, 381-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (reducing sanctions against corpora-
tion whose officer persisted in asserting privilege despite good faith efforts of corporation).
225. See, e.g., George Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reid, 392 U.S. 286 (1968); United States v. 42
Jars, More or Less, of "Bee Royale Capsules," 264 F.2d 666 (3d Cir. 1959).
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iv. The Relevancy Problem
Assuming that the invokings of the defendant and its employees are
treated as statements of a party, defendants still might claim either that
the invokings do not prove any relevant fact in issue in the civil case or
that their probative value is outweighed by their prejudicial impact.226
The probative value of the invokings in establishing facts relevant to civil
liability will vary from case to case and from question to question, and the
parties undoubtedly will seek to establish why the privilege was invoked
and what a complete response would have admitted. Occasionally, the in-
vokings will be highly probative. But when a shrewd defendant and its
employees invoke the privilege at the earliest opportunity, refusing, for
example, to answer any questions about their work, the invokings merely
suggest in a vague way that some circumstantial evidence of some criminal
conduct exists.227 In such a case, no one but the invoker can do more than
guess about the information being suppressed. The more innocuous and
open-ended the question, the less the plaintiff and the factfinder can ascer-
tain what the invoking shows. The suppressed response might have impli-
cated the defendant in crimes other than those creating liability in the civil
case. The response might have tended to incriminate only because it
would have created the mistaken appearance of criminal conduct. Or the
privilege might have been invoked purely as a safety measure by one who
believed himself innocent but who still felt uncertain about the possible
application of complex laws to his conduct. If attorneys routinely advise
clients to invoke as a safety measure, courts might believe that the proba-
tive value of invokings is marginal.
But even when invokings in response to apparently innocuous questions
do not reveal much about whether the invoker engaged in the conduct at
issue, they at least show the factfinder why the plaintiff has not been able
226. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by its prejudicial effect).
227. The most careful analysis of the inferences that logically follow from an invoking remains
Noonan, supra note 43. In civil cases, Professor Noonan concluded, an invoking at least creates an
inference that circumstantial evidence of the invoker's criminal conduct exists. Id. at 322-31. But
Professor Noonan did not discuss whether invokings in civil cases also create an inference that circum-
stantial evidence exists of the invoker's actionable conduct. Whether and to what extent invokings
suggest actionable conduct will vary with the circumstances. In general, when the civil case contains
allegations of an essentially criminal nature the invoking is more likely to be probative. In a famous
civil case based on fraud, invokings and refusals to testify by employees of corporate defendants were
found highly probative:
These gentlemen [officers of the defendant corporation] have the right to remain silent, to
evade, to refuse to furnish information, and thus to defy the government to prove its case; but a
court of equity has the right to draw reasonable and proper inferences from all the circum-
stances in the case, and especially from the silence of Secretary Fall and from the failure of
Sinclair to testify.
United States v. Mammoth Oil Co, 14 F.2d 705, 729 (8th Cir. 1926) (equitable action arising from
Teapot Dome scandal), afid, 275 U.S. 13 (1927).
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to establish his case from the invoker's lips. The invokings at least explain
why the plaintiff has resorted to other evidence, often less direct and infer-
ior. The more vague and circumstantial the plaintiff's evidence, the
stronger the inference against him from his apparent failure to confront
those in possession of more direct evidence. Revealing the invokings dis-
pels the inference that the plaintiff is calling less knowledgeable witnesses
only because he knows or fears that the more knowledgeable invoker
would provide adverse information. Hence, the negative relevance of in-
vokings-their tendency to dispel the unspoken inference against the
plaintiff-must be added to their positive relevance-their tendency to
make the facts at issue more or less likely.228
Admittedly, bringing an invoking to the jury's attention will prejudice
the invoker. The revelation that he has claimed the privilege marks him as
a criminal who has probably eluded justice. The jury is not likely to real-
ize that the innocent may invoke. The invoking may also distract the jury
from the main issues in the case by drawing their attention to the in-
voker's character and inviting speculation about the crimes he may have
committed. Furthermore, admitting the invoking may increase delay by
encouraging defense counsel to offer evidence about possible crimes, unre-
lated to the instant civil case, that may have prompted the invoking.22'
In short, some out-of-court invokings may be excluded from evidence if
a court balances only the apparent positive and negative probative value
against the possible prejudice, distraction, and invitation to delay. To sup-
port a general rule admitting invokings of defendants and their employees,
the procedural and equitable reasons favoring admission must also be al-
lowed to enter into the calculus. Courts must consider the threat that in-
vokings present to the policies underlying liberal discovery and to plain-
tiffs' right to meaningful access to the courts. They must also consider the
inadequacy of the other possible remedies for plaintiffs.
The defendant who invokes so early as to obscure the probative value of
228. Professor Saltzburg has emphasized that in applying FED. R. EVID. 403, see supra note 226,
courts should evaluate the negative as well as the positive relevance of evidence. That is, evidence may
be relevant to counteract a negative inference from a party's failure to offer other evidence as well as
to make a fact in issue more or less probable. Saltzburg, A Special Aspect of Relevance: Countering
Negative Inferences Associated with the Absence of Evidence, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1011, 1019 (1978).
As the Supreme Court has pointed out, juries draw negative inferences from the absence of certain
evidence. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 298-303 (1981).
Of course, defendants may claim that when they or their employees invoke and therefore fail to
testify as defense witnesses, the jury is as likely to draw an inference against them as against the
plaintiff. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226 (1939) (drawing infer-
ence against civil defendants from failure of their executives to testify). Admitting that such an infer-
ence is also likely, however, does not detract from the fact that when the plaintiff fails to call the most
knowledgeable witnesses, an inference may arise against him which he should be able to counter by
explaining that those witnesses have invoked.
229. Under FED. R. EVID. 403 evidence should be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the dangers of delay or confusion of issues.
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his invokings is in no position to complain when his own invokings are
admitted. In any event his counsel will remain free to explain to the jury
why the invokings prove nothing and to suggest why the privilege was
invoked at all.
Other equitable considerations also call for admitting the invokings of
the defendant's employees. 20 If the defendant's own invokings are not re-
vealed, the jury at least will realize that the defendant failed to testify and
can draw inferences favorable to the plaintiff. But when the defendant's
employees never appear, an inference favorable to the plaintiff is less
likely, if only because the jury may be uncertain about the employee's role
or even his existence. Moreover, unless employee invokings of marginal
probative value are admitted, a defendant-employer facing civil exposure
may possess a tremendous incentive to pressure his employees to invoke in
such a way as to minimize the probative value of their invokings. In civil
price-fixing cases, for example, all defendant-employers might be sorely
tempted to badger employees into invoking at every opportunity. 3
These considerations call for admitting past invokings generally and let-
ting the attorneys argue their probative value to the factfinder. The
factfinder should learn the questions prompting each invoking. If the in-
voker or his attorney announced an intention to invoke in response to all
questions on certain subjects, with the result that further questioning on
those subjects ceased, the factfinder should learn of that announcement.
To avoid confusing the jury, counsel should explain the nature of the dis-
covery instruments or proceedings during which the invoking occurred.
The court's instructions should indicate that the jury is free to consider
the invokings insofar as they tend to establish the facts in issue.232
Because the reasons for admitting the invokings are not purely eviden-
tiary, courts might choose to ground their admission upon procedural and
equitable considerations alone. Then courts could refuse to admit invok-
ings with slight probative value if those invokings have not interfered ma-
terially with the plaintiff's discovery. For example, a defendant who in-
voked in a criminal trial but responded fully to discovery requests
throughout a later civil suit should not have his invoking admitted against
230. To admit into evidence the invokings of the defendant himself but not the invokings of em-
ployees of corporate defendants would lead to incongruous results. When a sole proprietorship is sued,
the invokings of its owner will be admitted. Had he incorporated, his invoking would not be admissi-
ble in a suit against the corporation. Yet historically courts have attempted to restrict the protection
that the privilege affords a corporation. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 52 (1906).
231. In certain circumstances, courts have recognized a public policy against one person advising
another to invoke. See, e.g., Cole v. United States, 329 F.2d 437, 443 (9th Cir. 1964) (advising an-
other to invoke constituted obstruction of justice if done with corrupt motive).
232. Many discretionary decisions will remain for the court, including whether to instruct the
jury that the invoker was entitled to invoke, and whether to allow defense counsel to repeat a self-
serving statement the invoker may have given when he invoked.
1125
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 91: 106i, 1982
him at the civil trial unless evidentiary considerations alone warrant
admission. 33
But if out of court invokings are not considered admissible evidence, the
source of the court's authority for bringing them to the jury's attention is
unclear. The court may need to resort to its supervisory authority over
discovery, an authority enabling it to enter any order justice requires to
protect a party from oppression.234
On balance, the evidentiary basis for putting the invokings before the
jury seems preferable. The modest fiction that all invokings during civil
discovery sufficiently relate to liability to be admitted makes more sense
than an equitable or procedural rule warning an invoker that although no
sanctions against him are possible, the jury will be told of his methods.
2. Shifting the Burdens
Admitting invokings into evidence will not neutralize the full value of
the privilege to the defense. If the defendant and its employees invoke
throughout the civil case, the defense may suppress enough evidence about
the disputed conduct that a failure of proof results, even when the
factfinder considers the positive and negative probative value of the invok-
ings. The court must then grant the defendant's motion to dismiss at the
close of the plaintiff's case based on plaintiff's failure to present sufficient
evidence of the defendant's actionable conduct.23 In such cases, the plain-
233. In general, any invokings by the defendant or its employees that have not interfered with the
plaintiff's civil discovery should be treated in the civil case based on their evidentiary status alone. If
their probative value is outweighed by their prejudicial effect, they should be excluded. Such invokings
might have occurred in earlier criminal trials, grand jury investigations, or civil actions.
The same should be true when the government is the plaintiff in a civil suit. Otherwise, govern-
ment attorneys handling grand jury investigations that may lead to a later civil suit as well as a
criminal prosecution will be tempted to call witnesses before the grand jury merely to get their invok-
ings on record for use in the civil suit. Cf. infra pp. 1132-33 (discussing need to prevent plaintiffs
from abusing remedies proposed).
234. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). On the other hand, it is clear that no sanctions are authorized
under FED. R. CIV. P. 37 for failure to grant discovery of privileged information since under FED. R.
CIV. P. 26(b)(1) privileged information is expressly made not discoverable. Moreover, the Supreme
Court has emphasized that Rule 37 is the exclusive authority for sanctions for a violation of the
discovery rules, and that courts have no inherent powers to create other sanctions. Societe Internatio-
nale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 207 (1958).
In private antitrust cases, invokings by defendants or their employees may support an award of
prejudgment interest even if they do not support Rule 37 sanctions. The Antitrust Procedural Im-
provements Act of 1980 states that in deciding whether to award prejudgment interest the court shall
consider, among other factors, "whether . . . either party's representative . . . engaged in conduct
primarily for the purpose of delaying the litigation or increasing the cost thereof." 15 U.S.C.A. § 15
(3) (West Supp. 1982). While the issue has not yet been raised, lawful invokings may be found to
constitute conduct engaged in primarily to delay or to increase the cost of litigation.
235. A defense strategy of invoking in order to assure a failure of proof is especially appealing
because, as discussed above, an alert defense may reduce the probative value of the invokings by
claiming the privilege as soon as possible, even in response to open-ended and apparently innocuous
questions. See supra pp. 1123-24 (discussing low probative value of early invokings).
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tiff needs yet another remedy: The court should shift to the invoking de-
fendant the burden of producing evidence about its conduct. This remedy
would enable the plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss at the close of his
case.
The remedy would shift to the defendant the burden of introducing evi-
dence sufficient to enable the factfinder to determine that the defendant
has not engaged in the actionable conduct alleged in the plaintiff's com-
plaint. Failure to meet this burden would result in a directed verdict on
the issue against the defendant. Meeting the burden would return the par-
ties to their original position, with the plaintiff bearing the risk of non-
persuasion, that is the burden of proving that the defendant did engage in
the actionable conduct.236 Meeting the burden would also leave the issue
of the defendant's conduct for the factfinder, unless the evidence was so
imbalanced as to mandate a directed verdict. Should the issue of the defen-
dant's conduct ultimately go to the jury, the earlier shifting of the burden
of production would not affect the jury instructions. 2"1 Of course, the court
may still instruct the jury to consider the probative value of the defen-
dant's invokings.
To prevent abuse, courts should not employ the proposed remedy auto-
matically whenever a defendant or its employees invoke. The invokers
may have responded extensively to queries about their conduct and in-
236. In the federal system, FED. R. EVID. 301 forbids shifting to the defendant the ultimate bur-
den of proof concerning his conduct. The rule adopts the so-called "bursting bubble" approach, under
which only the burden of production may be shifted. See FED. R. EVID. 301 advisory committee note
(discussing "bursting bubble" approach).
Whether the bursting bubble approach should be rejected in favor of shifting the burden of proof as
well as the burden of production lies beyond the scope of this Article. For arguments in support of the
bursting bubble approach, see J. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON
LAW 336-37 (1898); 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 249(2) (3d ed. 1940). Some commentators have
objected to this approach because it does not give adequate weight to the reasons for the presumption.
E.g., Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1959);
Morgan & Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REV. 909, 913
(1937). The proposed Federal Rules of Evidence rejected the bursting bubble approach, but Congress
restored it. See FED. R. EVID. 301 House and Senate Judiciary Committee notes.
Under the compromise reflected in the 1953 version of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, the bursting
bubble approach was followed only if the immediate basis for the presumption did not tend to prove
the facts presumed; when the presumption arose because of the probative value of the plaintiff's evi-
dence, the burden of proof was shifted as well. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 14 (1953). The
primary reason for shifting the burden when the privilege against self-incrimination is invoked is the
defendant's superior knowledge and access to evidence about its conduct rather than the probative
value of the invokings in showing that conduct. Thus, the compromise view would apply the bursting
bubble approach to an invoking. Moreover, the bursting bubble approach adequately serves the goal
of "smoking out" the defendant's version of events, a key goal whenever burdens shift because the
defendant has superior access to the evidence. The bursting bubble approach would also avoid any
constitutional objections that might be based on Western & At. R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639
(1929) (presumption that shifts both burden of producing evidence and burden of proof is unconstitu-
tional unless rational connection exists between facts proven and facts presumed).
237. See Louisell, Construing Rule 301: Instructing the Jury on Presumptions in Civil Actions
and Proceedings, 63 VA. L. REV. 281, 301 (1977).
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voked only when asked about matters peripheral to the civil case. Some-
times the circumstances may indicate that the failure of proof results from
the plaintiff's lack of diligence or the obvious lack of merit in his allega-
tions. Equity does not require shifting the burden in such instances.
Rather, the burden should shift only when the invokings appear to have
contributed substantially to the plaintiff's failure of proof. By the time the
plaintiff has completed the presentation of his case, the court should be
sufficiently familiar with the allegations and the discovery background to
be able to apply this standard.
There is nothing unusual or extreme about this proposed remedy. The
legal system no longer automatically imposes the burdens of proof and
production on the party with the burden of pleading the issue.238 Instead,
fairness and experience guide the allocation of these burdens. Equitable
factors to be considered include the parties' relative knowledge of the facts
and their access to evidence. 23' Accordingly, courts sometimes shift the
burdens to the defense on the ground that it possesses superior knowledge
of the facts. In torts cases, for example, defendants faced with a claim of
res ipsa loquitur may need to make a preliminary showing that they were
not negligent.2 , ° Similarly, a bailee of damaged goods bears the burden of
proving either that he was not negligent or that his negligence did not
238. 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 236, § 2486.
239. See Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARV. L. REV. 906, 910-11
(1931). A party's relative knowledge and access to evidence is not the only factor to be considered in
allocating the burden. In Wigmore's words, "the consideration furnishes no universal working rule";
rather, it "merely takes its place among other considerations of fairness and experience as a most
important one to be kept in mind in apportioning the burden of proof in a specific case." 9 J. WIG.
MORE, supra note 236, § 2486, at 275. The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of the
party's knowledge and access to evidence in allocating the burdens. See United States v. New York,
N.H. & H.R.R., 355 U.S. 253, 256 n.5 (1957); Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New York Tank
Barge Corp., 314 U.S. 104, 111 (1941).
240. The famous tort case of Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944), illus-
trates this rule. After an appendectomy, the plaintiff in Ybarra awoke with a paralyzed right shoul-
der. He attempted to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, but was unable to indicate which of
those treating him was probably guilty of the negligence that caused his injury. In reversing a nonsuit,
the California Supreme Court, referring to res ipsa loquitur, announced:
If the doctrine is to continue to serve a useful purpose, we should not forget that the particular
force and justice of the rule, regarded as a presumption throwing upon the party charged the
duty of producing evidence, consists in the circumstance that the chief evidence of the true
cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to [the defendants] but inaccessi-
ble to the injured person.
Id. at 490, 154 P.2d at 689. The court's ruling thus required the defendants to make a preliminary
showing of their own lack of negligence. Just as judicial opposition to a suspected conspiracy of silence
among the defendant doctors and nurses may have provided the impulse for Ybarra, opposition to the
defense team's strategy of blocking discovery by having defendants and their employees invoke at every
opportunity may provide the impulse for shifting the burdens here.
The need to shift the burden of production in order to "smoke out" the party with superior access
to the evidence diminishes as the opposing party becomes more able to obtain the evidence through
discovery. More liberal rules of discovery, therefore, have rendered the Ybarra approach unnecessary





An invoking defendant plainly knows more about his own conduct, and
is likely to enjoy better access to significant evidence, than a plaintiff who
is kept outside the "conjurer's circle" created by the privilege. Moreover, a
corporate defendant is more likely than a plaintiff to learn about the con-
duct of its invoking employees, if only because the employees must assist
their employer in responding to interrogatories addressed to the corpora-
tion. In the rare case in which an employer cannot learn about its employ-
ees' conduct directly from the invoking employees, it still has greater ac-
cess to other sources of information such as other employees or company
records. Its superior access to these other sources better equips it to pre-
sent evidence of the invoking employees' conduct despite any obstructions
imposed by the invokings.
Other equitable considerations also support shifting the burden of pro-
ducing evidence about the defendant's conduct. As discussed above, an in-
voking by a defendant or his employee ought to be treated for evidentiary
purposes as an admission by a party that the reply would suggest criminal
conduct.242 To call on such a party to explain why the evidence suggests
its criminal liability but fails to show civil liability to the plaintiff hardly
seems unjust, especially since the voluntary invokings of the defendant or
his employees foreseeably contributed to the plaintiff's lack of evidence.24'
Some courts seem increasingly aware that equity may require the shift-
ing of burdens when a privilege not designed to further policies related to
241. E.g., Knowles v. Gilchrist Co., 362 Mass. 642, 651, 289 N.E.2d 879, 884 (1972) (placing
burden of proof on bailee, who has greater access to evidence of due care or negligence).The burden
shifts to the bailee-defendant solely because he or his employees usually possess superior knowledge of
the cause of the damage and superior access to the critical evidence. There is no suggestion that the
burden shifts because of the probative value of the evidence in showing probable liability. The burden
of production and the burden of proof may also be shifted in other contexts if the defendants enjoy
superior knowledge or access to evidence. See, e.g., Browzin v. Catholic Univ., 527 F.2d 843, 849
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (dictum) (defendant university's superior access to information may justify shifting
to it burden of proving reasonable efforts to find alternative position for dismissed professor); Lake v.
Callis, 202 Md. 581, 97 A.2d 316 (1953) (shifting to bankrupt burden of showing what happened to
proceeds of mortgage loan).
242. See supra pp. 1117-28.
243. After invoking, the balance of equity between the parties resembles that in tort cases where
there is evidence of the defendant's negligence but, due to unavoidable circumstances, it is unclear
whether the negligence probably caused the plaintiff's injury. A well known example is Summers v.
Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948), in which it was clear that the plaintiff was injured by one of
two defendant hunters who shot in his direction but unclear as to which defendant's shot probably hit
the plaintiff. The court shifted both the burden of production and the burden of proof on the causa-
tion issue to the defendants on the equitable ground that the mystery about causation, if not dispelled,
should be resolved in favor of the injured plaintiff rather than the apparently negligent defendants.
Summers suggests that the defendants' culpability, supported by the invoking statement, is another
factor to be considered in allocating burdens.
This is not to suggest that the defendant's invoking-an act that foreseeably can lead to the plain-
tiff's failure of proof-constitutes wrongdoing of any kind. Consequently, cases such as Haft v. Lone
Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970), which call for shifting the
burden when the defendant's wrongful acts foreseeably cause the failure of proof, do not apply.
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civil liability obstructs access to matters essential to a plaintiff's case. Re-
cent defamation cases against newspapers illustrate this approach. Under
modern defamation law, a plaintiff must show that the defendant newspa-
per was at least negligent in publishing false and defamatory facts:2" A
newspaper may be negligent if it reports information from plainly unreli-
able sources. 4 5 While a reporter can be forced to reveal his sources, 4 the
New Hampshire Supreme Court has chosen to shift burdens in an at-
tempt to ensure fair treatment for the plaintiff while avoiding unnecessary
contempt proceedings against reporters who refuse to reveal sources.4 7
The Court's approach is to presume from the reporter's failure to disclose
the source that no source in fact existed. This presumption allows the
plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to show negligence but
still requires him to show the other elements of his action-that the publi-
cation was false and defamatory. The reporters, on the other hand, will
not need to reveal sources unnecessarily; they will only need to do so when
the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence on the other elements of his
case.
The need to shift the burden of producing evidence when defendants or
their employees invoke will arise only when the plaintiff fails to present
sufficient evidence of the defendant's actionable conduct. But without this
remedy, the defense will be tempted to use the privilege to draw the wid-
est possible "conjurer's circle" about its conduct while gambling on the
plaintiff's inability to find sufficient evidence elsewhere.
3. Barring the Midnight Witness
The privilege becomes an offensive weapon when the defendants or
their employees who have previously invoked waive their privilege in or-
der to testify at trial. The remedy recommended here is to prevent the
previous invokers from testifying, at least until they submit to a deposition
at which they waive the privilege and respond to the plaintiff's
questions. 4
244. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (private citizen must show some
fault on part of defendant newspaper); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (public
official must show "actual malice" on part of defendant newspaper).
245. E.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968).
246. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
247. Downing v. Monitor Publishing Co., 120 N.H. 383, 415 A.2d 683 (1980). The approach in
Downing was followed in DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 507 F. Supp. 880 (D. Hawaii 1981), and cited
with approval in Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 597 (1st Cir. 1980).
248. A few courts have barred the previous invoker from testifying. E.g., Duffy v. Currier, 291 F.
Supp. 810, 815 (D. Minn. 1968); A & M Records v. Heilman, 75 Cal. App. 3d 554, 566, 142 Cal.
Rptr. 390, 397 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); Constanza v. Constanza, 66 N.J. 63, 328 A.2d 230 (1974).
Because the invokers have not violated any discovery rules, the authority for barring the testimony
arises under FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (or its state equivalents), which authorizes any orders needed to
protect a party from oppression. Other courts have merely postponed the invoker's testimony unless he
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To allow the previous invokers to proceed with their testimony at trial
mocks the discovery process. The defendant may claim that the plaintiffs
are adequately protected as long as they are able to bring out the prior
invokings for impeachment purposes, should they appear inconsistent with
the in-court testimony. But this claim ignores the tremendous strategic
advantages the defense obtains from concealing its version of events until
the middle of the trial. Allowing the invokers to testify forecloses the
plaintiff's opportunity to scrutinize, investigate, and prepare to neutralize
the defense version of events, an endeavor for which ample time would
have been available save for the earlier invokings. The policy considera-
tions that require giving these advantages to a criminal defendant do not
operate in a private civil case.2 9
The prejudice to the plaintiff resulting from this defense stratagem
rarely will be cured merely by postponing the invoker's testimony until
the plaintiff can depose him. This approach is appropriate only if suffi-
cient time remains between the last-minute deposition and the in-court
testimony to permit the plaintiff to prepare his case adequately. Even
then, the delay caused by the previous invokings invariably works to the
defense's advantage. By postponing their responses, defendants and their
employees gain the valuable opportunity to adjust them in light of the
plaintiff's evidence. Prejudice also may arise from the plaintiff's loss of
preparation time. If the trial has begun before past invokers announce
their desire to waive, the entire trial usually will need to be postponed, for
the plaintiff certainly would be prejudiced if required to depose the invok-
ers, follow up the depositions, and adjust his case accordingly while fully
embroiled in the trial. Postponing the trial, not coincidentally, usually fa-
vors the defense. Accordingly, in the vast majority of instances in which
an invoker does not waive the privilege until trial, the court should bar
him entirely from testifying.2 0
When previously invoking defendants and their employees indicate
before trial their willingness to waive and respond to discovery, the deci-
sion whether to allow them to testify at trial should turn on the degree of
prejudice caused the plaintiff by their earlier invokings. The court should
consider the length of time between the invokings and the invokers'
change of heart, and between their change of heart and trial; the extent to
submits to a deposition where the privilege is waived. E.g., Meyer v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 591
P.2d 259 (Nev. Sup. Ct. 1979).
249. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d 1181, 1192-95 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (discussing why
criminal defendant need not submit to broad discovery expected from civil defendant).
250. An order barring the invoker from testifying should not raise constitutional problems. Cf.
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (state statute requiring defendant to disclose names of alibi
witnesses prior to criminal trial or be barred from testifying does not violate Fifth Amendment
privilege).
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which the invokings enabled them to learn about the plaintiff's evidence
before responding; and the extra costs incurred by the plaintiff. Of course,
even if the invokers are allowed to testify at the trial, their previous invok-
ings in the civil case should be admissible.
When the defendants or their employees have responded to some lines
of questioning and invoked on others during discovery, they should be
barred from testifying on the subjects and questions to which they in-
voked. The difficult issue becomes whether they should be allowed to tes-
tify on the subjects and questions to which they responded. The standards
currently applied in criminal cases when an in-court witness testifies in
part and invokes in part should govern here.251 They require the court to
determine first whether the privilege was properly invoked; often by re-
sponding on some lines of questioning, the invokers will have waived the
privilege.1 2 Assuming the privilege was properly invoked, the court
should strike the entire testimony unless the questions to which the wit-
ness invoked concerned collateral rather than direct matters.253 Questions
relating solely to the credibility of the witness usually are deemed collat-
eral; questions relating to the subject-matter of his testimony invariably
are deemed direct.2 14 The line between direct and collateral matters is not
clear, and many invokings undoubtedly will be difficult to categorize. The
fundamental issue, however, is whether the plaintiff's inability to obtain a
response to some of his questions creates a substantial danger of prejudice
by depriving him of the opportunity to test the truth of the witness's other
testimony.255 Of course, even if the court allows some testimony from a
former invoker, the plaintiff should be able to admit into evidence the full
circumstances of the witness's earlier invokings.
4. Controlling the Remedies when Prosecution Is Pending
A special situation arises when the defendant or employee from whom
information is requested in the private civil case is also a defendant in a
pending criminal prosecution. In such a case, there is an acute risk that
251. See Dunbar v. Harris, 612 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1979) (refusal of prosecution witness on Fifth
Amendment privilege grounds to answer questions on cross-examination did not require striking of
his direct testimony, because questions on cross-examination related to collateral matters); United
States v. LaRiche, 549 F.2d 1088, 1096-97 (6th Cir. 1977) (same), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 987 (1979).
When a witness testifies voluntarily, the privilege is waived on cross-examination as to matters
made relevant by the testimony on direct. See Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958). One
court recommends striking the civil defendant's entire trial testimony when he invokes at any point.
Annest v. Annest, 49 Wash. 2d 62, 63, 298 P.2d 483, 484 (1956).
252. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374 (1951).
253. United States v. Stephens, 492 F.2d 1367, 1375 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 852 (1974);
United States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 822 (1963).
254. Coil v. United States, 343 F.2d 573 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 821 (1965).
255. United States v. Decidue, 603 F.2d 535, 552 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946
(1980).
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responses to discovery requests in the civil case will harm the defendant's
strategic position in the criminal case. Faced with such a dilemma, most
criminal defendants, innocent or guilty, probably would choose to invoke
in the civil case.
In this situation, the automatic triggering of the various remedies pro-
posed above in the civil case would invite some abuse." 6 Plaintiffs and
potential plaintiffs would be tempted to schedule civil discovery before the
criminal trial merely to get the criminal defendant's invoking on the re-
cord. Plaintiffs then would be assured of being able to admit the invoking
against the invoker or his employer and, perhaps, of barring the invoker
from testifying. Thus, the proposed remedies, however appropriate for
neutralizing the privilege weapon generally, would operate harshly in
light of the practical pressure on the criminal defendant to invoke.
A court alert to these concerns can obviate any need for the criminal
defendant to invoke by staying the plaintiff's discovery requests directed to
the criminal defendant until after the conclusion of the criminal trial. 7
Granted, the plaintiff will be disadvantaged by the postponement of what
might be his most important discovery requests. But the Speedy Trial
256. The situation here where plaintiff is seeking discovery must be distinguished from that aris-
ing when a party to the prosecution in a pending criminal trial demands discovery as a litigant in the
civil suit. Then the danger that the party is demanding discovery to circumvent the limits on criminal
discovery increases the need for a stay. In such cases the courts often stay all civil discovery. See, e.g.,
United States v. Mellon Bank, 545 F.2d 869 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Bridges, 86 F. Supp.
931 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
257. Such stays have been granted. See, e.g., Perry v. McGuire, 36 F.R.D. 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1964);
Paul Harrigan & Sons, Inc. v. Enterprise Animal Oil Co., 14 F.R.D. 333 (E.D. Pa. 1953); National
Discount Corp. v. Holzbaugh, 13 F.R.D. 236 (E.D. Mich. 1952). The usual standards for staying
part of a civil suit pending completion of a criminal case require the party requesting the stay to show
that going forward would inflict a greater hardship on him than the stay would inflict on the opposing
parties and on the public interest. See Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-56 (1936). In
addition, the stay must not be broader in scope or extend for a longer period than is reasonably
necessary. See Dellinger v. Mitchell, 442 F.2d 782, 786-87 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Texaco, Inc. v. Borda,
383 F.2d 607, 608-09 (3d Cir. 1967).
Many courts in civil cases have refused to grant a stay of discovery from a party who is also a
criminal defendant pending the disposition of the related criminal case. These courts have held that
the public interest in the speedy progress of the civil proceedings outweighed the criminal defendant's
interest in withholding his testimony until after the criminal proceedings are complete. See, e.g., De
Vita v. Sills, 422 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1970); Coalition of Black Leadership v. Cianci, 480 F. Supp.
1340 (D.R.I. 1979); SEC v. Gilbert, 79 F.R.D. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
When the court in charge of the civil case refuses to stay discovery from the criminal defendant, the
court in the criminal case should not be tempted to enjoin the civil proceedings. The criminal defen-
dant may protect his rights in the criminal case by invoking in the civil case, provided the adverse
publicity from that invoking can be controlled. Therefore, the civil proceedings do not threaten the
criminal defendant's rights, although they may indeed unearth incriminating evidence that the prose-
cutors may use. Comity considerations also weigh against interference in the civil case. See United
States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 388 F.2d 201, 204 (3d Cir. 1967); United
States v. Simon, 373 F.2d 649, 652-53 (2d Cir. 1967). See generally Landis v. North Am. Co., 299
U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936) (discussing considerations pertinent to decision to stay civil proceeding).
When the criminal defendant responds to discovery in the civil case after a stay is denied, his re-
sponses are not considered "coerced" and are admissible against him in the criminal case. See United
States v. Solomon, 509 P.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1975).
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Act,25 8 together with its state equivalents, should minimize the postpone-
ment of the plaintiff's discovery. The harm to the plaintiff will also be
mitigated if he is allowed to proceed with his other discovery requests." 9
This proposal is not meant to suggest that the defendant will be unable
to invoke once his criminal trial is over. He may continue to invoke as
long as his response might tend to incriminate him of any crime for which
prosecution is theoretically possible.2 6' Rather, the assumption here is that
the practical pressure on the criminal defendant to invoke regardless of
guilt or innocence will have diminished upon the conclusion of the crimi-
nal trial. Moreover, the former criminal defendant who continues to in-
voke indefinitely imposes a much greater disadvantage on the plaintiff
than one who invokes only before his criminal trial. Accordingly, any in-
voking by a civil defendant or his employees after the criminal trial should
trigger the remedies recommended here, as long as no other indictments
against the invoker remain.
To some extent, the same concerns that apply to those facing trial apply
to invokers facing criminal investigation. The pressures on a target in a
pending grand-jury investigation to avoid issuing statements in the civil
case may also be severe. In fact, similar pressures apply to all invokers
who face a genuine danger of futureprosecution. But to allow the imposi-
tion of the recommended remedies to turn on whether the invoker faced a
"sufficient" danger of prosecution would be to force yet another unwork-
able guideline on the courts. Although any bright-line rule seems arbi-
trary, a rule only allowing one who plans to invoke in a civil case to stay
discovery from himself when he is the defendant in a pending criminal
case provides a workable standard that reduces the potential hardships of
both the defendant and the plaintiff.26
1
258. Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3152-3156, 3161-3174, 28 U.S.C. § 604 (1976).
The Act allows ten days from indictment to arraignment and sixty days from arraignment to trial. 18
U.S.C. § 3161(c). Delay of indictment or trial is permissible for various reasons specified in the Act.
Id. § 3161(h).
259. Staying all discovery in the private civil case until the end of the criminal case is rarely
appropriate unless all parties in the civil suit so desire. . See In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust
Litig., No. 456 (D. Md. May 26, 1981). The standards for staying all discovery are set forth in
Golden Quality Ice Cream Co. v. Deerfield Specialty Papers, 87 F.R.D. 53, 56-58 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
260. See supra TAN 11.
261. Another concern when the invoker in the civil case is facing a criminal trial is the danger
that admitting his past invokings into evidence at the civil trial will create pre-trial publicity that
prejudices his right to a fair trial in the criminal case. This danger should not be overstated, however.
For one thing, it should only arise when the civil trial is to occur shortly before the criminal trial.
Admittedly, when the invoking in the civil case occurs during civil discovery, but the civil trial itself
is to occur after the criminal trial, publicity about the invokings may threaten the criminal defendant's
rights, regardless of whether the invokings are admissible. But in this situation the courts should be
able to reduce the publicity about the invokings by granting a protective order that would bar the civil
parties from disclosing the invokings to the media. The parties should remain free, however, to dis-
close the invokings to the government. Because the government's own prosecutorial interests would be
jeopardized by pre-trial publicity, it should refrain from disclosing the invokings to the media.
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Conclusion
Various administrative considerations defeat any attempt to confine the
use of the privilege against self-incrimination in civil cases to occasions
when the response would increase significantly the likelihood of criminal
prosecution. Even so confined, the privilege, when fully exploited, puts the
private civil plaintiff at a disadvantage more severe than previously appre-
ciated. Especially when civil liability allegedly arises from criminal con-
duct, the privilege precludes discovery and frustrates the truth-determin-
ing capacity of the litigation process to an alarming extent. Admittedly,
the measures recommended here do not directly improve the likelihood
that the truth ultimately will be discovered. In themselves they primarily
reduce the disadvantage plaintiffs suffer when the privilege weapon is
used against them. By so doing, however, these measures, if employed
consistently, should open up discovery by dissuading those who do not fear
prosecution from using the privilege to draw a "conjurer's circle" around
all aspects of their conduct.
At civil trials before the criminal trial, on the other hand, past invokings will inevitably come to the
attention of the media. Rather than attempting to keep the invokings secret, the court in the civil case
should explore other methods for reducing adverse publicity about them. For instance, the court in the
civil case should consider cautioning the news media that publicizing the invokings will jeopardize the
invoker's right to a fair trial in the ensuing criminal case. See ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS § 3.5(d) (1968).
The judge in the criminal case may also employ various methods to reduce the effect of publicity
about earlier invokings. These include special questions and procedures on voir dire;, sequestration of
jurors; cautionary instructions to jurors, parties, and the media; exclusion of the public from certain
hearings; and change of venue. Id. § 3.1-.5.
If the court in the civil case feels its efforts, even when combined with the efforts of the court in the
criminal case, will not control the prejudice from publicity about the invoking, it should stay the civil
trial until the criminal trial is finished. See United States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 388 F.2d 201, 205 (3d Cir. 1967).
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